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Plus Ça Change Author(s): François de Rose Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1998), pp. 174-175 Published by: Council on Foreign Relations Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049119 . Accessed: 15/06/2014 15:07 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Affairs. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 195.34.79.192 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 15:07:40 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Plus Ça Change

Plus Ça ChangeAuthor(s): François de RoseSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 1998), pp. 174-175Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049119 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 15:07

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ForeignAffairs.

http://www.jstor.org

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Page 2: Plus Ça Change

Letters to the Editor

LOOK SOUTH

To the Editor:

By focusing on

Uganda, Rwanda,

Ethiopia, and Eritrea, somewhat more

marginally on Angola and South Africa, and even more distantly on Tanzania,

Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Burundi, Dan

Connell and Frank Smyth seem to have discovered hope for the future, at least

for Central Africa ("Africa's New Bloc,"

March/April 1998). Interestingly, their conclusions coincide with the question able policy implied by Secretary of State

Madeleine K. Albright during her visit to Africa last December.

Albright was correct in identifying the vast former Zaire, now known as the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, as

the key to the region. It may still be

ungovernable, and continued anarchy could precipitate a breakup, sowing chaos among its squabbling neighbors. But Albright may now regret including President Laurent Kabila among the

region's "strong leaders." I was American

consul in Bukavu, Zaire when Kabila's

Simba rebellion erupted in 1964, and his

behavior then made it easy to predict that

his current regime would be repressive and corrupt. It does not even control

the whole Congo. Rwanda cannot anticipate peace. The

current Tutsi government, representing 15

percent of the population and opposed by the remaining, overwhelmingly Hutu, 85

percent can be expected neither to respect human rights nor to remain internally

unchallenged, with or without American

military training. The massacres of 1994

and 1996 will almost surely be repeated. Yoweri Museveni has been the "non

political" president of Uganda for 12 years without elections. Although he has made

some progress in establishing a market

economy, there is little intimation of when

or whether Uganda will hold elections.

However, Musevini was willing to pay to train and supply the Rwandan Tutsis

(perhaps with U.S. acquiescence) and,

reportedly supported by the United States, assist the long-standing non-Muslim

rebellion against the Islamist government of Sudan. This bodes ill for stability.

Connell and Smyth place great hope on the triumvirate core of the new bloc:

Museveni, President Isaias Afwerki of

Eritrea, and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

of Ethiopia. The last two are now engaged

in a violent border dispute. American

diplomats are scurrying around the area

to negotiate a solution to a conflict in

which there is little reason for American

involvement. Southern Africa, more

than the "new bloc," is a more logical area of American interest. Post-apartheid South Africa, with its natural resources,

well-trained work force, technology,

and, one hopes, stability, can become

an example and a source of inspiration,

leadership, and cooperation in helping its neighbors develop and stabilize.

WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELE, JR.

Retired Foreign Service Officer

PLUS ?A CHANGE

To the Editor:

Dominique Mo?si explains the difficulties France, "burdened with the

weight of ancient traditions and images of the past," encounters in adapting to

globalization and finding its "place and status in a new world" ("The Trouble

with France," May/June 1998). But France

is perhaps the European country that has

changed most in the second half of this

century. Before the war, France was a

[174] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume77No.s

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Page 3: Plus Ça Change

Letters to the Editor

predominately agricultural, highly pro tectionist nation of 40 million people

with a colonial empire second only to

Britain's. Today, shorn of all colonial ties, it counts nearly 60 million people and

is the fourth- or fifth-largest industrial

economy, the fourth-biggest exporter of

industrial and agricultural goods, and a

member of a free trade area with 300 mil

lion people. It also leads European efforts

in the Ariane and Airbus aerospace pro

grams and, with 80 percent of its energy

nuclear, has perhaps the cleanest energy sector of any industrialized country. So

one should not despair of the French

capacity to adapt to new contingencies. In foreign affairs, France's two main

postwar objectives?reconciliation with

Germany and construction of a European

union?have harmonized with, not

opposed, the basic goals of American

foreign policy. The main frictions between

Paris and Washington were about defense

issues that, with the end of the Cold

War, are mostly trivial. Recently, French

forces took part in the Persian Gulf War and were, with the British, the first to go into Bosnia.

Anti-American feelings are inevitable

on both the far right and far left, but the

building of the European Union is not motivated by envy of the United States.

Rather, it reflects the recognition that in

the next century the only chance for

Europe to be an actor on the world stage is through unification. Those who realize

this best are the youth, who, ignoring frontiers and roaming the continent

with backpacks and sleeping bags instead of passports, hope to study in

American universities.

FRAN?OIS DE ROSE

Former French ambassador to NATO

Foreign Affairs (issn 00157120), September/October 1998, Volume yy, Number 5. Published six

times annually (January, March, May, July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New

York, NY 10021. Subscriptions: U.S., $44.00; Canada, $54.00; other countries via air, $79.00 per

year. Periodicals postage paid in New York, NY, and at additional mailing offices. Postmaster:

Send address changes to Foreign Affairs, P.O. Box 420235, Palm Coast, FL 32142-0235.

ERRATUM

The caption of the photograph on

page 173 of the July/August issue

(Volume 77y Number 4) misidentified the men as U. S. troops. They

are

members of Britain's Royal Air Force.

We regret the error.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS September/Octoberi998 [175]

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