Community politics and ethnicity among Lebanese in Nova Scotia

Community politics and ethnicity among Lebanese in Nova Scotia

N A N C Y w . J A B B R A Dalhousie University*

Les leaders des groupes ethniques pourraient bien influencer I’identitC et les contours ethniques par le biais du processus de la formation des factions. Pour mieux comprendre cette proposition, l’auteur nous prCsente dans cette Ctude l’analyse de cinq disputes au sein de la communautC libanaise d’Halifax. en Nouvelle-Ecosse.

Ethnic group political leaders can affect ethnic and other parochial boundaries and identities through the process of faction formation. Five disputes from the Halifax area Lebanese community are examined with the intention of illuminating this process.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Politics play a major part in creating and defining ethnic groups and boundaries. This is especially true when political actors use ethnicity and other parochial identities to gain and keep power. Politics within the ethnic community are important for other reasons as well. The community is a political arena, although a small one, and one that for many immigrants is more important than the larger arena. Minority ethnic groups may not be large enough to form voting blocs. Moreover, a substantial number of immigrants have not been in the country long enough to become citizens. Those who have may still lack the linguistic skills, the cultural knowledge, and the social ties necessary to participate in the politics of the larger society. Additionally, they may perceive that they are not yet fully accepted by charter group Canadians. In short, their participation in ethnic community politics indicates a low level of assimilation and acculturation.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association held in Cincinnati, Ohio, in November, 1979. The ethnographic research on which it was based, carried out from 1977 to 1981, was supported by a grant from the Canadian Department of Secretary of State. I would like to thank my collaborator, Dr. Joseph G. Jabbra, Academic Vice President, Saint Mary’s University, Halifax, for his part in the research on which this article is based. I would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the CRSA‘s anonymous referees.

This paper was received in June, 1983 and accepted in August, 1983. Rev. canad. SOC. & Anth. / Canad. Rev. SOC. & Anth. 21(4) 1984

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Students of plural societies have shown that the notion of ethnic groups as fixed entities is highly problematic.' Moerman (1965), in his classical paper on the Lue of Northern Thailand, found them to share a number of cultural traits with non-Lue in the same region; ethnic variation was continuous, not discrete. Moreover, Lue and members of other tribes might change their ethnic identity. Also, both Lue and non-Lue used ethnic labels in different ways, for different classifications of people. What is especially interesting is that the tribal units and names apparently originated as political units, with territories and capitals. So, political conquest might eventually result in changes in ethnic affiliation.

Horowitz (1975) pointed out that ethnic groups can split into smaller groups, or fuse into larger ones, by either amalgamation or incorporation. He cited the example of a town in northern India where both processes are going on. Entirely new groups may also come into existence; for example, the mulatto group in the West Indies was created by the mixing of blacks and whites, although black and white ethnic groups also continued to exist. Identity was contextual, and multiple in level. The same individual might refer to himself as belonging to a certain family or caste in one context, a certain village in another, or to his religion, his region, or his nation, in still other contexts. Last, Horowitz stressed the importance of political boundaries in eliciting ethnic identities; in general, the larger the political boundaries, the larger the relevant identities (and vice-versa). This phenomenon has implications for political conflict. For example, Hindu-Muslim conflict resulted in the creation in 1947 of two states in the Indian subcontinent, India and Pakistan. Instead of peace resulting, however, conflict along ethnic and regional lines developed in both states, leading to the partition of Pakistan into Pakistan and Bangladesh, and continuing ethnic conflict in India.

In Beyond the Melting Pot, Glazer and Moynihan (1970) challenged the notion that the disappearance of ethnic groups through assimilation and acculturation is inevitable. In New York City, locus of their study, many ethnic groups are so large that politicians must satisfy their desires, at least to some extent, in order to gain and hold office. Consequently, ethnic identity and structures persist.

Daniel Bell explained the worldwide resurgence of ethnicity in similar terms. 'Ethnicity has become more salient because it can combine an interest with an affective tie' (1975: 169). Ethnic interests, in turn, are both economic and political; as the government increasingly controls the economy, groups find it necessary to participate as blocs in the political process in order to get a fair share. Ethnicity, then, becomes a strategic choice by individuals, who might otherwise choose other identities or affiliations.

Burton Benedict, concluding a study of the development of ethnically plural politics in Mauritius in the wake of independence and the extension of the franchise, stated: 'In the first instance it is not the pluralism but the politics we must examine' (1970: 40). Although Mauritius was ethnically plural, its politics did not become plural until the rules of the political game were altered; the island's ethnic composition did not change at all. Here, although political factors did not create ethnic groups, they did cause them to become important political blocs.

As Lasswell (1958) stated long ago, politics are about who gets what, when, and how. This suggests that the motivation and activities of ethnic political leaders may be important in creating and changing ethnic and other parochial identities. After describing the Halifax area Lebanese community, I will examine how Lebanese

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community leaders have altered group identities and boundaries in attempting to win political prizes in their ethnic community arena in Halifax, Nova Scotia.

THE LEBANESE I N HALIFAX

I will focus my analysis of ethnicity and politics among Lebanese in Nova Scotia mainly on the Canadian Lebanon Society (CLS), one of the principal Lebanese social clubs in Halifax.’ Lebanese first settled in the Halifax area around the turn of the century. Most of the early immigrants came from northern Mount Lebanon. After the initial settlement, few Lebanese immigrated until the period following World War II. There was also a heavy wave of immigration following the Lebanese civil war of 1975-76. The more recent immigrants have come from various parts of the country, many from the Akkar region to the north of Mount Lebanon.

It is difficult to be precise about the number of Lebanese in the Halifax area. Millward estimated that there were about 700 Arabic speakers in the area in 1976, but that there were at least twice as many Lebanese as that.’ Although they do not live in a neighbourhood of their own, their highest concentration is in the West End of Halifax, and their lowest concentration is in the urban fringe areas (1981: 40-5). Out of all of the Lebanese communities in Nova Scotia the one in the Halifax area offers the fullest range of cultural and social facilities, although it could hardly be termed institutionally complete (Breton, 1964). 4.

Today’s Halifax Lebanese show a number of cleavages. First is the religious: there are about equal numbers of Orthodox Christians and Maronites (perhaps 40 per cent/6o per cent),5 with almost no Lebanese Muslims, and very few Christians from other confessions. Second is the regional: most are either from Mount Lebanon, or from the Akkar region (north of Mount Lebanon, near Tripoli). These broad regional cleavages tend to coincide with the religious cleavages. Thus, most of the Maronites are from Mount Lebanon, while most of the Orthodox are from the Akkar.

Lesser cleavages subsumable under the regional category include home town origin and extended family membership. A small sub-bloc within the Maronitel Mount Lebanon bloc consists of the Kafr il-Balad group, people originally from Kafr il-Balad (pseudonym). A certain large extended family, the BCdaoui family, is very important within the Kafr il-Balad group.

The third major cleavage is political: in general, the Akkar immigrants show no consistent political affiliation (that is, with reference to old country politics). At one time, the Mount Lebanon immigrants were united in supporting the Kataib (or Phalangists), but their unity has since broken down. Now, based mainly on kinship and home town ties, they tend to support either the Phalangists, the Marada (FrangiC bloc), or the Ahrar (Chamoun bloc) (see below).

The Canadian Lebanon Society (CLS) was founded in 1938 by a group of first and second generation Lebanese, all of whom were men. Its purposes are manifold: to further the ties of Lebanese to Canadian political institutions; to promote the Arabic language and Lebanese culture, particularly among the young; to further social intercourse among Lebanese; to benefit needy Lebanese; and to maintain the prestige of Lebanese in the wider Canadian society. In general, it may be said that the prestige, social, and benevolent purposes have been the most successfully met.

Its numbers have fluctuated over the years, at times becoming very low.


Following World War 11, membership was increasingly dominated by first generation immigrants, to the gradual exclusion (probably by default) of the Canadian born. In 1950 a women’s auxiliary was formed, and in 1960 the women became full members of the CLS.

Activities have varied over the years. There were many social gatherings, of course. Arabic films were brought, and plans were made to distribute cedar seeds. During World War II the CLS contributed financially to the war effort; some members joined the armed forces, and the society’s first president was killed in action (a Halifax street was named for him). Some unsuccessful efforts were made to bring a Lebanese priest to Halifax, and contributions were sent to various charitable and political causes in Lebanon. The building or renting of a hall was discussed for many years, and for a brief period in the 1950s a hall was rented. The society now owns a building. In the 19605, it joined the Multi-Cultural Association of Nova Scotia, and it now contributes entertainment to various multicultural functions. Finally, in the 1970s it joined the Lebanese World Cultural Union, and now sends delegates to that body’s annual congresses. As can be imagined, many of these activities became the subject of acrimonious debate, and a number of these issues will be discussed below.

LEBANESE C O M M U N I T Y P O L I T I C S

Ralph Nicholas’s analysis of factions presents us with an appropriate framework for examining the role of Lebanese political leaders in forming and reforming ethnic and other parochial boundaries. He defines factions in terms of five characteristics: dFactions are conflict groups. This means that factions tend to emerge in conflict situations. z/Factions are political groups. In other words, they operate within the public context. j/Factions are not corporate groups. That is, although they may persist for considerable periods, they are basically imperman- ant. 4/Faction members are recruited by a leader. They do not select him to be their leader; rather, he collects them. 5/Faction members are recruited on diverse principles. They do not necessarily have anything in common apart from their allegiance to the leader (1965 : 27-9).

These characteristics apply to factions among the Lebanese in Halifax: I/ Cleavages within the community are not necessarily factional. For example, the religious division is not always significant in conflicts. Moreover, the political positions of both leaders and followers change from one conflict to the next. z / Although the conflicts examined took place within the smaller ethnic community arena, they were still public. 3/On the whole, factions within the community have been short-lived. The only even partial exceptions have been the Kafr il-Balad sub-bloc and various kin groupings, both of which have some corporate characteristics. 4/The faction members are recruited by their leaders, who might be described as self-selected. As we d l see below, the leaders differ little from their fellows in terms of objective characteristics, and they do not form an elite stratum. 5/Many kinds of ties link faction members to their leaders. Moreover, the kinds of links emphasized change from one conflict to the next.

As mentioned above, Lebanese community leaders differ little from their fellows. They are neither wealthy nor poor, the majority being moderately to very

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successful independent businessmen. The overwhelming majority of the immi- grant household heads, and well over half of the Canadian born, are self-employed businessmen. Similarly, few of the leaders are better educated than the majority of Lebanese. They (the leaders) have all been immigrants (except for the founder of the CLS), but have resided in Canada for at least five years. The leaders generally do not come from leading families in Lebanon, do not form a unified clique, and are not likely to pass their leadership positions on to their offspring, who typically are uninterested in community politics.

Factions in the Halifax Lebanese community are formed on six bases: i/Place of origin (this refers to both home town and region); z/old country political party, bloc, or ideology; 3/religion or denomination; 4/kinship; 5/personal opposition, or the principle of me first, against him. A Lebanese saying states: ‘/Killun ruus/‘ (’they’re all bosses’). Everyone wants to be leader; no one wants to be a follower, to acknowledge anyone else as superior to him in any way. Thus, if one cannot lead, he will work against another; if one is black, the other must be white - he must always oppose his rival even if it means changing his principles. The sixth and final basis of Lebanese factions is the tie of friendship. This frequently follows the lines of religion, place of origin, or political party. Anyone familiar with politics in Lebanon at any level will recognize these six bases as powerful forces in Lebanese political culture (see N. Jabbra and J. Jabbra, 1978). Since the Halifax community is now dominated by first generation immigrants, it is not surprising that Lebanese community politics are based on the same political culture.

As an arena, the Halifax-area Lebanese community offers would-be political leaders a number of prizes for which they compete: d T h e office of Honorary Consul of Lebanon. The present incumbent was the first holder of this office. He spends a great deal of his time issuing visas and passports, and carrying out the other responsibilities of the job. A few years ago, there were rumours that he might resign. At once two contenders to succeed him came forth, each with a following.

2/Club presidency. The founder of the CLS was its first president, and since then, most CLS presidents have been community leaders. Many served for more than one term. The other important club presidency is that of the new Lebanese Association of Nova Scotia.

3lCommunity benefactorship. Who will be recognized withm the community as one who did something great for the Lebanese in Halifax, such as bringing a priest, obtaining government funds, sponsoring a cultural event, or establishing an institution of some sort? Such a question can be the basis for considerable conflict.

4/Faction leadership. It is in some ways a prize by default, and usually emerges as follows: X and Y compete for an office, say presidency of the CLS. Y loses. Rather than accept defeat graciously and form a loyal opposition, he (Y) is likely to secede, at least for a time, with his followers and allies. He may even be tempted to form a new club. Thus, he can continue to be a leader, perhaps even a president.

In some ways it is surprising that anyone would wish to occupy a position of leadership within the Lebanese community. The financial rewards are minimal at best, for club assets are not large. Community leaders have little power over other Lebanese. The Honorary Consul, for example, cannot refuse a valid passport request, and the fees he collects are small. The major rewards, it seems, are prestige


and glory. However, for these the leader must struggle with an aggregate of uncooperative individualists who are ever ready to undercut him if he is successful, or blame him should he fail.

My analysis of how ethnic community politics can affect ethnic community boundaries, cleavages, and identities will be based on five disputes within the Halifax area Lebanese community and the CLS. They are: i/The Lebanese-Syrian question. Should the CLS be Lebanese only, or Lebanese and Syrian? Are Lebanese and Syrians the same, or different? This question came to prominence at the founding of the Canadian Lebanon Society in 1938. dThe regional dispute. This one began as a challenge to domination of the society by the Kafr il-Balad sub-bloc, and became evident in the early 1960s. Gradually, this dispute polarized into a Mount Lebanon-Akkar feud. 3/The Maronite Bishop affair. A Maronite bishop from the U.S. visited Halifax in 1977. He held a solemn Mass in one of the local Roman Catholic churches, and was welcomed by the community. Disputes arose as to who should represent the community to the bishop - the Honorary Consul or the president of the CLS. Further disagreements occurred over who was responsible for local arrangements. After the bishop left, it was discovered that the president of the CLS had donated $1,000 of the society’s funds to the bishop - and it was not only the Orthodox who were outraged over this action. 4/The Kataib-Marada split. During the Lebanese civil war of 1975-6 most Halifax Lebanese solidly supported the Kataib (Phalanges Libanaises); indeed, the Kataib founder’s son and its military commander, the late Bashir GCmayel, was the guest of honour a t the banquet held in November, 1977, to celebrate Lebanese Independence Day. At that time in Lebanon, the three major Maronite politicians, Camille Chamoun, Pierre G6maye1, and Suleiman FrangiP, had joined forces. After the war was over, they fell out among themselves; FrangiC’s son was massacred by a body of Kataib members, and the two groups are still at odds (see J. Jabbra and N. Jabbra, 1978; 1980, for a detailed description of contemporary political alignments and issues in Lebanon). In Halifax, their representative followers also became divided among themselves. 5/The bringing of the priest. In the summer of 1979, a Maronite priest came to Halifax with the aim of organizing a parish. The Orthodox responded by bringing a deacon; subsequently a bishop was sent to organize a parish. The Maronite priest has himself been the subject of a split among the Maronites, and there have been conflicts about the priest among the Orthodox, too.

These five disputes were used by members of the Lebanese community to attain leadership positions, mainly within the Canadian Lebanon Society. Using the six bases for faction formation outlined above, they recruited their supporters.6

The Lebanese-Syrian Question At one time, immigrants from what is now Lebanon had called themselves, and been called, Syrians. Several factors were responsible for the Syrian-Lebanese combined identity. Much of modern Lebanon was part of Syria until 1920. Also, up through 1955, the Canadian Immigration Department classified Lebanese and Syrians together as Syrians. Moreover, Lebanon and Syria belong to the same linguistic and cultural sub-area of the Arab world. Even now there are family ties across the border of the two countries (see Hitti, 1967).

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It is hard to tell why Charles BCdaoui, founder and first president of the Canadian Lebanon Society, conceived the idea that Lebanon and Syria were distinct; most of his contemporaries in 1938 seemed content with the Syrian identity. Surely he had not read the works of Lebanese nationalists such as ‘Jouplain’ (Bulos Nujaym), or the old Maronite historians who wrote of Lebanon as though it were not part of the Ottoman Empire. He also never went to Lebanon. However, he had been raised by his grandparents, so presumably he was steeped in old country ways. They were from Kafr il-Balad, in Mount Lebanon, core of the modern state.

At some time, informants told me, Charles BCdaoui wrote the French consul in Ottawa or MontrCal for confirmation of his belief that Lebanon and Syria, Lebanese and Syrian, were distinct entities. The consul replied that they were separate, like Canada and the u.s.; indeed, since 1920, they had been under separate French mandates. What is not clear is whether he wrote the consul before organizing the CLS, or after being challenged by those who favoured a combined Lebanese-Syrian association. The CLS minutes refer to the financial director of the society receiving and reading a letter from the ‘French High Commissioner’ (location unspecified; contents of letter not described). This may or may not have been the letter referred to by my informants.

The first minutes for the Canadian Lebanon-Syrian Society (sic) are recorded for 13 November 1938. Evidently this was not its first meeting. The meeting recorded in the minutes took place in the law office of Charles Bedaoui, who acted as chair. He opened by declaring the previous vote on the society’s name ‘unconstitutional’; he wanted the name to be the Canadian Lebanon Society. He was supported by others of Kafr il-Balad origin, and opposed by members who were from Mount Lebanon (as all of the founders were) but not from Kafr il-Balad. After some discussion they voted, and Charles Bedaoui had his way: the society was Lebanese. Then he outlined the constitution, and they passed it. Next they elected officers, and Charles BCdaoui became the first president.

Reading between the lines, one senses that BCdaoui railroaded events to get his way. The meeting was held in his office, he chaired it, and he declared the previous vote unconstitutional even before there was a constitution. He was also elected first president. As subsequent events show, the use of the Lebanese issue was indeed a successful ploy to dispose of opposition, leaving the club in control of people from Kafr il-Balad. The Kafr il-Balad monopoly on leadership was to last until the 1960s.

It seems that the disaffected then founded a separate society, called the Lebanon Syrian Association (LSA). My informants said that it was headed by John Joseph, born in a Mount Lebanon village rather far from Kafr il-Balad. At subsequent meetings of the Canadian Lebanon Society, the possibility of merging with the Lebanon Syrian Association was discussed. BCdaoui insisted that the CLS name and constitution be retained. Meetings were held with members of the LSA, who refused to accept the CLS name. At about the same time, the CLS received a letter from the Saint Joseph Association in Sydney, Nova Scotia, inviting them to join the Syrian Lebanon Federation; they declined. After a few more sets of minutes, the LsAis no longer mentioned. Informants told me that it did not last, and that most of its members eventually joined the CLS.

We can view Joseph as a faction leader who, for a time, was also a club president.


We cannot say whether he seceded because he wanted to become a leader, or because he genuinely believed in the Syrian identity. BCdaoui’s motives for leadership, and his use of the Lebanese vs. Syrian question, however, are much clearer. So are the bases for his support: same home town, region, and religion, and some kinship ties as well. Clearest of all is the outcome: henceforth, the club was the Canadian Lebanon Society, and the Halifax community was Lebanese, not Syrian. 7

The Regional Dispute From its establishment, the Canadian Lebanon Society was dominated by people from Kafr il-Balad, and especially by individuals from the BCdaoui family and families related to the BCdaouis by marriage. Allied with them were others from two villages near Kafr il-Balad. And for about twenty-five years, the CLS benefitted Kafr il-Balad through remittances and other forms of aid.

The first challenge to Kafr il-Balad leadership came in 1964, when Joe Isaac ran for CLS President against the incumbent, Jean BCdaoui (a distant relative of Charles Bedaoui). Isaac is Maronite, but not from the Kafr il-Balad area of Mount Lebanon. Before the members voted, BCdaoui asked the members to participate in the election ‘in the spirit of sportsmanship and love and to put aside all differences and to consider only the good interest of the society’ (CLS minutes). Obviously, sentiments of Lebanese brotherly love were not conspicuous, although regional- ism is not mentioned as such. A tie vote resulted, and the members adjourned until the next week. Then, BCdaoui was elected president, and Isaac vice-president. A month later, Isaac tried to resign, but evidently was persuaded to stay in the CLS. Three years later, Isaac was elected as president, but the following year Kafr il-Balad again controlled the CLS.

During the 1960s and I ~ ~ O S , the flow of Orthodox Christian immigrants from the Akkar region increased immensely. They took up the challenge to Kafr il-Balad domination of the CLS. The presidents in 1975 and 1976 were both from the Akkar. The next year saw three candidates for president, only one of whom was from the Kafr il-Balad area. Before the vote, Jean BCdaoui* spoke concerning unity and solidarity within the CLS. ’He asked the members to consider themselves as Lebanese from Lebanon and not Lebanese from certain districts of Lebanon’ (CLS minutes). The Kafr il-Balad area candidate was elected.

In 1978, he was re-elected in what could only be called a rigged election. His opponent, from another part of Mount Lebanon, was disqualified because he had not paid his dues.

Faction formation in the regional dispute was originally based on village origins, Kafr il-Balad vs. non-Kafr il-Balad. Gradually, the village origin cleavage became a regional one, Kafr il-Balad vs. non-Kafr il-Balad Mount Lebanon plus Akkar. Of course, within both the Akkar and Kafr il-Balad blocs, there were also ties of religion and kinship. Moreover, friendship and personal opposition also operated in the recruiting of political support, particularly in the joining of non-Kafr il-Balad Mount Lebanon with Akkar people.

The Maronite Bishop Affair This dispute did not so much concern the presidency of the CLS, but rather who would be established as a community benefactor (in this case, responsible for

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bringing a priest). It showed that common region and village origin are not permanent bases for political action, but may be superseded by personal loyalties based on kinship and friendship.

The dispute took place in 1977, but it had its origins at least as early as 1964, when the then president (Jean BCdaoui) and his executive council agreed to contact the Lebanese Embassy in Ottawa about the possibility of bringing a Maronite priest to Halifax. Not only would such a priest be in charge of the usual spiritual duties, but he would also be needed to teach Arabic to children and help preserve Lebanese culture. Evidently the CLS executive forgot that the CLS was not a denominational club. This early effort was unsuccessful.

In 1977, Tony Dib, from a village near Kafr il-Balad, was president, and he wanted to be remembered as a community benefactor. He and his executive council contacted a Maronite bishop living in a large city located in the U.S. Midwest.9 They wanted him to help bring a priest but, according to them, he invited himself to Halifax. Before his arrival, a dispute arose as to who would represent the Lebanese community in Halifax to the bishop, Jean BCdaoui, the Honorary Consul, or Tony Dib, president of the CLS. Another dispute concerned who was to be responsible for local arrangements.

The big dispute, however, took place over what happened during the bishop’s visit. He celebrated a Maronite mass in a Roman Catholic church in Halifax on 25 September and a famous singer from Lebanon contributed his services as cantor. The bishop gave a sermon in which he extolled the role of the Maronites in the history of Lebanon, but made no mention of the Orthodox or of any other denomination. Worse still, after the bishop left, Tony Dib revealed that without consulting the CLS members he had contributed $1,000 of the society’s funds to the bishop.

Predictably, the next meeting of the CLS was long (four hours) and heated (the minutes record that it ’was adjourned with confusion and disorder’). The Orthodox were upset because the bishop had talked about the Maronites as if they were the only Lebanese (just like the old Maronite historians). Not only the Orthodox, but also the BCdaouis and another family, the Sabas (and their relatives, allies and followers), were upset about the $I ,000 cheque, and indeed, about the CLS involvement in bringing a Maronite priest. The BCdaouis and Sabas are from Kafr il-Balad, but so is another family, the Rizqallahs, who supported Tony Dib. Most of the Orthodox from the Akkar, as well as most of the BCdaouis and Sabas (and their supporters) resigned from the CLS. Joseph Maroun (from Zgharta) tried to establish a new club, but did not succeed in gaining enough followers. Some of the BCdaouis tried to have the $1,000 cheque stopped, on the grounds that it was not properly authorized. They also engaged a lawyer, and threatened to sue Dib and the CLS executive.

Naturally, with only his supporters left in the CLS, Dib was re-elected in 1978. The following year, however, Charbel Malouf, a Maronite from a marginal region of Mount Lebanon, was elected. Serving for two terms, he made every effort to reconcile the disaffected with the remnants of the CLS. He was only partly successful, however. In 1981, Dib was re-elected.

Faction formation in the Maronite bishop affair was somewhat complicated. Religion was involved, since all of the Orthodox were opposed to Tony Dib. Village origin was not significant, since the people from Kafr il-Balad were split. Kinship

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and friendship ties were important, and so was personal opposition. Finally, region was not insignificant, since Joseph Maroun’s home town, Zgharta, is on the edge of Mount Lebanon.

The Kataib-Marada Split Whereas the previous conflict involved competition among individuals for leadership, albeit along well-established cleavages, the Kataib-Marada split is mainly a response to events in the old country. Thus, new cleavages and alignments in the Canadian Lebanon Society in Halifax appeared in the wake of similar realignments in Lebanon, as Nova Scotia Lebanese reacted just like their old country counterparts to the same regional and political ideological claims.

During the 1975-76 Lebanese civil war several so-called right-wing Christian (mainly Maronite) groups were allied. These were the Kataib (or Phalangists), led by Pierre GCmayel and his son Bashir; the Marada bloc, led by then president (1970-76) Suleiman FrangiC of Zgharta; and the Ahrar (or National Liberals) led by former President (1952-8) Camille Chamoun of Damour. All three of these recruit and maintain their followers through ties of personal loyalty to the leaders, and through ties of religion, common region or home town, and kinship. However, they differ in some respects. The Kataib is the largest and best organized, with a well-trained and armed military branch, and the best developed ideology. One of its members and son of its founder, Amin GCmayel, is President of the Republic. FrangiC’s leadership originated in inter-clan battles for supremacy in his home town, Zgharta, and he became president largely because of a split among Maronite leaders in parliament. Chamoun is a hardy perennial in the uncultivated garden of Lebanese politics; to mix metaphors, he has more political lives than the proverbial cat. He has changed ideology and alliances many times.

But, although politics makes strange bedfellows, they are not always kept in bed together for very long. First, FrangiC pulled his bloc out of the alliance. Next, a group of Kataib men attacked Ihdin, a town allied to Zgharta, killing Tony, the son of Suleiman FrangiC, together with his wife and daughter. Armed hostilities continued for some time between the two erstwhile allies, with the Kataib eventually gaining the upper hand.

All of these events had repercussions in Halifax. During the civil war, all Maronites and the majority of the Orthodox - and of course the Canadian Lebanon Society - were solidly behind the quadruple alliance (which also included Raymond EddC’s bloc). When Bashir GCmayel, head of the Phalangist military arm, came to Halifax in November, 1977, to appear at a celebration of Lebanese Independence Day, he was enthusiasticaly received. A big delegation met him at the airport; he and his entourage sat at the head table at the Independence Day banquet; he was introduced to all of the local Canadian notables; and several Lebanese appointed themselves as his bodyguards (or honour guard).

Then came the split between FrangiC and the Kataib. Tony Dib, president of the CLS, was a Phalangist. Joseph Maroun, who had been challenging his leadership for some time, was from Zgharta. He and his followers (mainly from Zgharta and the Akkar) felt humiliated by the attack, perpetrated by Maronites, on Ihdin, the home of Yusif Karam, a nineteenth-century Maronite hero. Dib and his supporters, on the other hand, claimed that Tony FrangiC had gotten unbearable. The argument went on, and the resulting split became too deep to repair.

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When the CLS planned a march to Province House in Halifax to protest the Syrian bombardment of Beirut in the spring of 1978, Dib and his supporters wanted to carry the Phalangist flag along with the Lebanese flag. Maroun and his supporters, of course, refused to go along with this, and the march did not take place. Thus, once again, ready-made cleavages from the old country provided a handy means for individualist political actors.

Faction formation in the Kataib-Marada split was in some ways simpler than in the other cases. One was either for or against the Phalangists. However, as usual, there were parallel cleavages. Most of the Orthodox Akkar group were anti- Phalangist. Home town was involved, since all of the Zgharta people were also anti-Phalangist. However, the main political ideological division took place so spontaneously that the faction leaders hardly needed to recruit supporters; all they needed to do was take advantage of the division. Indeed, they had to, if they were to retain their positions as leaders.

The Bringing of t h e Priest This conflict, begun with the affair of the Maronite Bishop, concretized the split between the Maronites and the Orthodox. It also perpetuated the split among the Maronites themselves which was partly based on the Kataib-Marada split, and partly on personal opposition among Jean BPdaoui, Joseph Maroun, and Tony Dib.

In 1979, a Maronite priest, the Reverend Qizhayya Bishr, arrived from Germany, where he had had a parish. What had happened was that the Maronite bishop who had visited Halifax in 1977 went back and contacted the Maronite patriarch. He, in turn, contacted the Vatican, which sent Father Bishr to Halifax. Father Bishr began to organize a parish. The first thing he did was to begin to collect money, with the ultimate aim of constructing a church.

Not all of the Maronites were pleased with their new priest once the initial euphoria of attending a real Maronite mass had worn off. The dissatisfied mainly included the BCdaouis and other families from the Kafr il-Balad sub-bloc. Those who supported the priest, mainly Tony Dib (who claimed credit for bringing him to Halifax) and about twenty families who were allied with him, claimed that the Bedaouis and their Kafr il-Balad supporters were annoyed because Father Bishr did not recognize what they thought was their rightful place of prominence in the Lebanese community. This may be so, but some informants disagreed.

The priest is said to have insulted a prominent member of the Orthodox group from the Akkar region, to be a strong Phalangist (a fact which does not please Joseph Moroun’s supporters), and to be very ambitious. For example, in August 1980, the CLS held a summer festival. Charbel Malouf was president of the society at the time, and he gave Father Bishr a prominent place in the proceedings: the priest recited a patriotic poem he had written, and he presented the CLS with a patriotic banner. These items, and their donor, were well received. However, on the day the festival was to begin, a Halifax newspaper ran a piece on its religion page which described the CLS as a Maronite club and the gathering as a Maronite reunion. Neither the Orthodox nor the Kafr il-Balad bloc were pleased. They said that Father Bishr had prepared such materials to be sent to the Vatican with the ultimate goal of getting himself appointed bishop. Most of the Kafr il-Balad group have now reverted to Roman Catholic parishes, and only attend the Maronite church on occasions such as funerals.


In the mean time, the Orthodox organized a parish under the auspices of a bishop who had been sent from the U.S. for that purpose. His arrival was the result of initiative on the part of some Halifax area Orthodox laymen, who contacted their coreligionists in Montreal. One of these is a high official in the Orthodox lay association in North America, and he, in turn, contacted the bishop.

The bishop, together with some prominent lay Orthodox from MontrCal, quickly established a whole set of parish organizations. Later, the Halifax Orthodox bought and remodelled an old church, and a young priest, Father George Raad, arrived with his wife. He, too, has encountered some conflict among his parishioners. Some have claimed that he has favourites among members of the parish. Also, the past president of the parish council and Father Raad disagreed over who was to be in charge of the parish. On more than one occasion a mediator had to be brought from MontrCal.

Despite the conflicts in both parishes, the conclusion is clear: the existence of two Lebanese parishes represents not only a denominational division, but also a political one. Moreover, the means of bringing the Maronite priest caused a factional split along line of kinship, political ideology, and region among the Mount Lebanon Maronites. The Orthodox factional split, on the other hand, is mainly along lines of kinship. In both confessions, leaders have had to take an active role in exploiting the factional divisions so as to remain leaders. In this continuing dispute, faction leadership and community benefactorship have been the main prizes.

C O N S E Q U E N C E S A N D C O N C L U S I O N S

As we have just seen, the conflict over bringing the priest resulted in the formation of two religio-political blocs. It, together with factional splits within the Maronite group along the lines of friendship, kinship, personal opposition, home town, and political ideology, resulted in the creation of two Maronite blocs, one of which is loosely affiliated with the Akkar Orthodox.

All of this had its effect upon the CLS. Early in 1981 it held its annual election of officers. There were two candidates, Joseph Maroun and Tony Dib. A third candidate, Jean BCdaoui’s son-in-law, ran in the hope of drawing votes away from Dib. As is usual in these elections, a number of individuals joined the club at the last minute to pack the ballot box for their candidate. This time it was supporters of Joseph Maroun. This act was challenged by several CLS members, most of whom were supporters of Tony Dib. The challenge was upheld by the CLS parliamentarian, and so Maroun and his supporters again left the CLS. This time, however, they got together with a group of Akkar Orthodox and formed a new club, with a new charter, and a new president, Joseph Maroun. Once again, a faction leader became president of a new club.

Thus far, the new club, the Lebanese Association of Nova Scotia, seems to be a success. Its charter contains a provision against joining the club just before elections; it has a rented hall in Halifax; it has already held a number of successful social functions; and it has gained recognition from elite Canadians.

The old club, the CLS, was headed by Dib for two terms. Its current president is a relative, covillager, and ally of Dib. One cannot predict whether the CLS will die out, survive, grow, or ultimately merge with the new Lebanese Association. What


can be predicted is that Halifax area Lebanese will not soon change their political behaviour and culture, and that conflicts similar to those I have just described will continue to take place for some time.

We can make a number of generalizations about the process of faction formation among Halifax area Lebanese. First, because the leaders are basically self-selected, their chief (although not only) motivation is personal opposition. They view each other as rivals, and try to stay ahead of the others. Second, the cleavages within the community already exist; the leaders did not create them. However, by using them to gain and maintain leadership positions, they emphasize them and reinforce them. Third, although as Nicholas (1965: 29) notes, the leaders can hardly be described as charismatic, they recruit their supporters by virtue of their personal characteristics: they have much in common with them; they are more forceful, persuasive, and articulate than their fellows; and they are adept a t gaining attention. Fourth, the three main leaders in the community today, Jean BCdaoui, Tony Dib, and Joseph Maroun, are all Maronites. It is highly probable that one of the Akkar Orthodox will one day challenge their leadership, given the denominational polarization that exists. A number of possible candidates are already visible.

Turning to the larger perspective of ethnicity and politics, a number of conclusions can be drawn. First, in line with Horowitz's prediction, it is clear that one result of Lebanese political leaders' activities has been to redefine more narrowly the boundaries of the political community, and thus to widen and deepen the cleavages within the ethnic group.

Most group members respond to downward shifts in significant political boundaries by downward shifts in the focus of group identity, and the probability is that secession and partition will result in contracted group boundaries but not necessarily less ethnic diversity (Horowitz, 1975: 140).

First, the broader Syrian-Lebanese identity (not to mention the still broader Arab one) was eschewed in favour of the narrower Lebanese identity. The way was thus opened for conflict along the lines of region, religion, or some other cleavage. Given the tendency for social cleavages among Lebanese to coincide rather than cross-cut, the high level of conflict and the progression of ever smaller units of conflict is not surprising.'" When we look at the results of a parallel development in the mother country, we perhaps ought to be thankful that the stakes in Halifax are low.

Second, ethnic identity (in an extended sense) is indeed not primordial and unchanging. Halifax area Lebanese have been able to accept a number of changes in identity, in accordance with their political allegiances or interests. In doing so, they followed leaders who manipulated and created ethnic issues for their own interest. Thus, Syrians became Lebanese, and the few holdouts may themselves have held their position because of political interests.

My third conclusion follows closely upon the second. Leaders and followers do use ethnic and other identities in the pursuit of their political interest. Bell (1975) was correct in asserting that political use of ethnicity can be very effective because feelings can be linked with interests. Among Lebanese in the old country or in Halifax, the feelings connected with ethnic or similar interests can be strong


indeed, and in Halifax they have been used successfully a t least in the pursuit of individual, if not collective, interests. Benedict (1970) is also correct. The very existence of ethnic ties or ethnic culture cannot alone create ethnic politics. They are means rather than cause. After all, Lebanese lived in Nova Scotia for forty or more years without being unduly troubled as to whether they were Lebanese or Syrian. The origins of Charles BCdaoui’s motivation may have been obscure, but they did not lie in any change in Lebanese culture or social organization in Nova Scotia. The ethnic ties and culture were real, but their political potential was only latent.

Fourth, the history of the Canadian Lebanon Society tells us something about the acculturation and assimilation of Nova Scotia Lebanese into the larger culture and society. The major political actors and their followers in the Halifax Lebanese community operate mainly according to old country political culture. Because their cultural values are still largely Lebanese and because they are not well acquainted with Canadian political culture, they tend to devote most of their energies and passions to politics within their narrow ethnic arena. Moreover, as long as Lebanese and Canadians alike perceive Lebanese as foreigners, the Lebanese are likely not to be accepted by Canadians in the larger political arena, and to hesitate to enter that arena because they expect not to be accepted.

Finally, the case of the Halifax area Lebanese shows that the conventional phrases ‘ethnic community’ and ‘ethnic group’ can be misleading in their connotations of homogeneity, harmony, and solidarity. We cannot easily change the language of social science, but we should remember that members of an ethnic community or ethnic group can differ among themselves in terms of political affiliation or ideology, social class, religion, or other dimensions (c f . Anderson and Frideres, 1981 : 36-54).

POSTSCRIPT

After I completed the final draft of this article, further developments demonstrated the continuing link between events in the old country and factional behaviour in the Lebanese community in Halifax. In September, 1983, the Canada Palestine Association sponsored a talk by a representative of the PLO commemorating the anniversary of the 1982 Sabra-Shatila massacres. Some of Tony Dib’s pro-Kataib supporters, wishing to commemorate the assassination of Bashir GCmayel and to promote their cause, staged a demonstration in the place where the talk was to be held. Not surprisingly, the demonstration escalated, although it is hard to tell exactly what happened from eye-witness and newspaper accounts. The following February, three men pleaded guilty to charges of causing a disturbance and resisting a police officer, although the Crown dropped assault charges (‘Three Men Plead Guilty‘ 1984).

Tony Dib was killed in December, 1983, in an automobile accident while on his way to attend a Kataib Party meeting in QuCbec. He received a hero’s funeral.

N O T E S

I The following discussion is not intended to be a complete survey of the literature on ethnicity, but only a view of materials pertinent to the relationship between ethnicity and politics.


z Other social clubs in the Halifax area of interest to Lebanese are the Lebanese Association of Nova Scotia (discussed later in this article) (about 150 members); the Kafr il-Balad Club, for young people whose paternal origins lie in Kafr il-Balad (about thirty members); the Arab Canadian Association, whose membership is not limited to Lebanese (about sixty families); and two student clubs based at Dal- housie University, the Lebanese Students Association (about thirty-five members) and the Arab Students Association (like the Arab Canadian Association in membership) (about thirty-five members). The CLS itself today has about sixty members, and was the only Lebanese social club in the Halifax area until the Kafr il-Balad Club was founded in 1973. The Canadian Lebanon Society and its rival, the Lebanese Association of Nova Scotia, are the most important clubs. Like all of the clubs, the size of their membership fluctuates, mainly in response to issues of concern to the Lebanese. Because voluntary associations are fairly new to Leba- nese culture, those many Lebanese who belong to no associations at all are not therefore cut off socially from the rest of their ethnic community, but instead are linked through kinship and friendship ties to other Lebanese.

3 The Halifax area today has the largest Lebanese community in Nova Scotia. Mill- ward (1981) used the mother tongue figures from the 1976 census in his analysis. As he noted, most Arabic speakers in Halifax are in fact Lebanese, but most Canadian born Lebanese do not consider Arabic to be their mother tongue - hence the two estimates.

4 For a fuller description of Lebanese immigration to Nova Scotia, and of their contemporary social and cultural life, see Jabbra, 1983.

5 Maronites are one of the Eastern Rites of the Catholic Church. Most Maronites in the Middle East live in Lebanon, where they have long been associated with Leba- nese nationalism. The Antiochian Orthodox belong to one of the several autocephalous national churches which developed from the Eastern branch of the Roman church in Constantinople. Antiochian Orthodox Christians are found throughout the Arab East.

6 All names in the following dispute cases are pseudonyms. 7 It is not a foregone conclusion that the Arabic speakers in Halifax today are called

Lebanese, as shown in the fact that they have other identities in other places in North America. In upstate New York they are called Syrians, even though they have much the same origins as in Halifax (McHenry, 1979). The same is evidently true in much of New England, and in the Prairie provinces. In Los Angeles, however, the several national origin groups (Jordanian, Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian, Palestinian) are distinguished, perhaps because so many of them are recent immigrants.

8 By this time, Jean Bedaoui had served several terms as CLS president, and had retired from contesting that position. In 1971, Suleiman FrangiC, then president of Lebanon, appointed him honorary consul in Halifax, having created the post for him. All honorary consulates were abolished by the Lebanese government in 1984 for reorganization.

9 Since 1983 Maronites in Canada have had their own bishop, residing in MontrCal. 10 Coinciding social cleavages are those resulting from superimposed group or category

memberships. For example, among the Halifax Lebanese immigrants from the Akkar are nearly all Orthodox Christians and non-supporters of the Phalanges Libanaises. Cross-cutting cleavages, on the other hand, result from overlapping group or category memberships. For example, in Lebanon Sunnite Muslims may be rural or urban,


rich or poor. I t is usually the case that cross-cutting cleavages reduce the level of conflict, while coincidence of cleavages raises its level. For an extensive review of the subject see Lijphart (1975: 7-15).

R E F E R E N C E S

Anderson, Alan B., and James S. Frideres 1981 Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives. Toronto: Buttenvorths Anon. 1984 ’Three Men Plead Guilty.’ The Mail-Star (Halifax), February 16: p. 29 Bell, Daniel 1975 Ethnicity and Social Change. Pp. 141-74 in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moyni-

Benedict, Burton 1970 Pluralism and Stratification. Pp. 29-41 in Leonard Plotnicov and Arthur Tuden

han (eds.), Ethnicity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

(eds.), Essays in Comparative Social Stratification. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press

Breton, Raymond 1964 Institutional Completeness of Ethnic Communities and the Personal Relations of

Immigrants. American Journal of Sociology 70: 193-205 Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan 1970 Beyond the Melting Pot (2nd ed.).Cambridge: MIT Press Hitti, Philip K. 1967 Lebanon in History (3rd ed.). New York: Macmillan Horowitz, Donald L. 1975 Ethnic Identity. Pp. 111-40 in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.),

Jabbra, Nancy W. 1983 Assimilation and Acculturation of Lebanese Extended Families in Nova Scotia. Canadian

Jabbra, Joseph G., and Nancy W. Jabbra 1978 The Failure of Consociational Democracy in Lebanon. Paper presented at the annual

meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, May, 1978

Ethnicity. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

Ethnic Studies 15: 54-72

1980 Le martyre du Liban. Revue de 1’UniversitC de Moncton 13: 123-50 Jabbra, Nancy W., and Joseph G. Jabbra 1978 Local Political Dynamics in Lebanon: The Case of ‘Ain al-Qasis. Anthropological

Lasswell, Harold D. 1958 Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? Cleveland: world Publishing Co. Lijphart, Arend 1975 The Politics of Accommodation (rev. 2nd ed.). Berkeley: University of California

Press McHenry, Stewart G. 1979 The Syrian Movement into Upstate New York. Ethnicity 6: 327-45 Millward, Hugh A. 1981 Regional Patterns of Ethnicity in Nova Scotia: A Geographical Study. Halifax:

Quarterly 51: 137-51


Saint Mary’s University, International Education Centre, Ethnic Heritage Series, VOl. VI.

Moerman, Michael 1965 Ethnic Identification in a Complex Civilization: Who are the Lue? American

Nicholas, Ralph W. 1965 Factions: A Comparative Analysis. Pp. 21-61 in Michael Banton (ed.), Political

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Systems and The Distribution of Power. A.S.A. Monographs (2). London: Tavistock

Documents

Community politics and ethnicity among Lebanese in Nova Scotia