Dossier #2 - Western Balkans

“The Balkans have become an area of

crucial interest for the

internationalization strategies of foreign

companies, extraterritorial investments

and banks, and the European choice is

the right way to ensure peace and

stability in the area; it is the will of

change towards a future of integration.

[…] This Dossier is certainly a useful

and detailed work, accessible from the

experts on these subjects to those who

simply want to be informed and updated

on the dynamics that go through the

Western Balkans”

The Western Balkans between

Divisions, Challenges and Opportunities

Dossier #2 - Mediterranean Affairs

July 2015

Copyright© 2015 by Mediterranean Affairs

All right reserved except for brief quotations in a review. This Paper must not be reproduced

in any form without permission in writing form the publisher.

Mediterranean Affairs is a Think Tank aiming to provide analyses that cover the

Mediterranean area. By carrying out extensive researches, the staff studies various issues of

international policy focused on defense and security, regional stability, and transnational

challenges such as economic integration.

The main objective is to provide detailed information to the public through the website,

writing analyses and editorials each week. Mediterranean Affairs also bases its development on

the organization of public events, such as conferences and workshops, as well as on

consultancies and interviews with the media.

July 2015

July 2015

1 The Western Balkans between Divisions, Challenges and Opportunities

Introduction ................................................................................................................... 2

Green Corridor: is problem for the Balkan stability? .................................................... 4

The Western Balkans: another challenge for European energy integration ................. 9

The geopolitical situation .................................................................................... 9

Future challenges .............................................................................................. 13

Montenegro, the Adriatic Sea and Western Balkans. Interview with His Excellency

Antun Sbutega.............................................................................................................. 15

Greece in an European and Mediterranean point of view. Interview with Prof.

Francesco Anghelone. ................................................................................................. 19

Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 26

References .................................................................................................................... 29

Authors ......................................................................................................................... 30

Summary

July 2015

2 Introduction

Introduction

The Yugoslav Wars, in the 1990s, had devastating effects on the Balkans until the

collapse and the progressive political, economic and social decline, but the overcoming of

the crisis in Kosovo is a turning point. The containment of dreaded consequences of another

destabilization of the Balkans, the flows of resources and support measures by the

international community, political changes and the beginning of the democratization

process are all factors that have inaugurated the process of reconstruction, structural

reforms and stabilization of the economy. The Balkans have become an area of crucial

interest for the internationalization strategies of foreign companies, extraterritorial

investments and banks, and the European choice is the right way to ensure peace and

stability in the area; it is the will of change towards a future of integration. The implosion

of the Balkans has sparked fifteen years of conflict, which have seriously damaged the

multi-ethnic nature of the region. Seven new States have emerged from the ashes of

Yugoslavia. Two of these, Slovenia and Croatia, are EU members. The others, including

candidates and potential ones, are passing through the democratic transition. The explosion,

a glimpse of more stability, a positive trend of economic growth also for the major global

contenders which have played complicated and diplomatic games in order to extend and

fully exercise their influence over the area. Power dynamics which have been called into

question by the change of the political and military balance following the failure of the

Soviet Union and, more recently, the new phase of the race for energy resources that sees

Russia and China protagonists. Although, the Islamic fundamentalism risks of rekindling

outbreaks, that alarm the European Union of a possible infiltration of jihadists from the

Balkans door.

Source: qui.uniud.it

July 2015


As it is said, these aspects emphasize the centrality of the Balkans as a case study for

understanding the political and economic dynamics that cross the Afro-Eurasia not only

from east to west but also from south to north. Therefore, with this dossier, Mediterranean

Affairs wants to shed light on the fundamental geopolitical and economic hot-spot of the

Western Balkans with the contribution of young researchers, successful academics,

professors and diplomats. During the reading, you can find the essay of the Ambassador of

the Republic of Montenegro in Italy, Antun Sbutega, who has told us about the politics and

economy of his country also in relation to the current crisis and the Mediterranean; the

interview to the Professor Francesco Angelone on the situation that Greece is experiencing

from the economic and migration point of view and two interesting compositions of

Francesco Angelone, researcher and expert on energy pathways, and Giorgia Durante,

researcher and expert on European and International Law.

This Dossier is certainly a useful and detailed work, accessible from the experts on

these subjects to those who simply want to be informed and updated on the dynamics that

go through the Western Balkans.

Federica Fanuli

Editorial Board Manager of Mediterranean Affairs

July 2015

4 Green Corridor: is problem for the Balkan stability?

Green Corridor: is problem for the Balkan stability?

By Giorgia Durante

One of the issues of most interest to political analysts is the "Islamic issue", the strategic role of

Muslim populations in the Balkans. It’s important to analyze the problems in the Balkan peninsula

from varied perspectives.

The aim of this article is to examine the geopolitical theory of Green Corridor based on “the long-

term goal of Islamist ideologues, both in the Balkans and in the wider Muslim world, to create a

geographically contiguous chain of majority- Muslim or Muslim-dominated polities that will extend

from Turkey in the southeast to the northwestern-most point of Bosnia” .

Balkan Muslims constitute a diffuse and complex set of stories, culture and ethno-national

communities, that make complicate any understanding of the larger issues. In the light of these

considerations, are Islam populations a real problem for the stability of Balkan?

The Balkan peninsula runs along 218.73 km² area that is home to a landscape of

diverse ethnic groups, religions and cultural traditions. Although the diversity can be

an excellent element for change and growth, in the case of the Balkans it led to

fratricidal wars that have made the powder keg of Europe, due to the numerous victims

who have dotted the area.

One of the issues of most interest to political analysts is the "Islamic issue", the

strategic role of Muslim populations in the Balkans. It’s important to analyse the

problems in the Balkan peninsula from varied perspectives.

In the first place cannot be construed as Balkan Islam atomically since it has various

interpretations in different religious communities. Sometimes, in fact, the confessional

element reflects the ethnic identity of the group itself, as is the case for the Muslims of

Bosnia (Boshnaci) that they found in the Islamic faith the principle of ethnic

commonality, which prevented their absorption in the Croats, Serbs and the latter for

most of Catholic-Orthodox faith.

July 2015


On the contrary, in the case of Albanians in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, Islam

characterizes the majority of the population but is not the only element of commonality

of ethnicity, which is reflected primarily in the common cultural root of Turkish origin.

Finally, down to the South of the Balkan peninsula, it is noted that for the Turkic

peoples of Greek Thrace, Muslim belief is the direct consequence of ethnicity.

According to some analysts, the multiple interpretations of Islam in different ethnic

groups do not to frame it as a unitary phenomenon with possible strategic

repercussions on the region and surrounding areas.

In contrast to other scholars, overcoming the multiple meanings of Islam in the

Balkan populations, emphasize the existence of a religious objective constraint, which

would be a connection between different groups.

This interpretation supports the thesis of a "strategic Islam", able to make Balkan

Muslims as a group structurally compact and potentially relevant from a geopolitical

point of view. It is in this perspective that fits the theory of Green Corridor that Serb

Srdja Trifkovic analyst defines this way:

1. To define the long-term goal of Islamist ideologues, both in the

Balkans and in the wider Muslim world, to create a geographically

contiguous chain of majority- Muslim or Muslim-dominated polities

that will extend from Turkey in the southeast to the north-western

most point of Bosnia (120 miles from Austria).

2. To denote the on-going process of increasing ethno-religious self-

assertiveness among major traditionally Muslim communities in the

Balkans, this has had a fourfold effect:

Source: albawaba.com

July 2015


a. Expanding the geographic area of their demographic dominance;

b. Establishing and/or expanding various entities under Muslim

political control with actual or potential claim to sovereign

statehood;

c. Enhancing the dominant community’s Islamic character and

identity within those entities, with the parallel decrease of presence

and power of non-Muslim groups; and

d. Prompting Muslim communities’ ambitions for ever bolder designs

in the future, even at the risk of conflict with their non-Muslim

neighbours. Giving some clarity to this concept is essential to a

comprehensive understanding of the motives, actions, and

emerging expectations of different actors in the Yugoslav wars in

general and the on-going Kosovo crisis in particular”.

The geopolitical theory of "green corridor", has acquired an importance in its

discussion to the geopolitical strategy in the Balkan peninsula. The definition given by

the Serbian scholar Srdja Trifkovic, highlights, such as the "green corridor" is perceived

by the Slavic Christian majorities as a common enemy to fight, a potential threat to the

fragile stability of the area because of the population growth of the populations of the

Islamic faith.

In the light of these considerations, it is appropriate to try to understand whether

the danger of Islamic unification movement is effective or simply a mere political

construction, designed for the art to prevent a process of social and cultural integration

of the vast galaxy of ethnic groups settled in the Balkan peninsula.

To answer fully to this question, it is necessary to do an analysis on two different

levels:

1. Composition of Muslim populations;

2. The Leadership of Muslim populations.

As regards the first element, it has been previously stated that it cannot be

considered atomically the phenomenon of Balkan Islam since it lacks a uniform

perception of religious belief. Cannot thus be examined the religious component

July 2015


generically and detached from particular ethnic group or specific State in which it is

held.

Therefore, the geopolitics

construction of a “green corridor”

falls completely before the

disintegration of the single

Muslim populations, United by

Islam but completely away from

each other for traditions and

ethnicity (think that Bosnians

Muslims feel Slavs, opposed by

Albanians and Turks of Thrace

Greece that recall their origins to

the Ottoman Empire).

The spectre of Balkan green dorsal back to pose his long shadow on the strategic

arrangements of the peninsula if the leaders decide to unite asserting their territorial

supremacy. In fact, Carlo Emilio Milani asserts:

this approach could be the result of the action of States-sponsors, and

undoubtedly would be facilitated by a process of radicalization within the same

leaderships, that could provide an ideological adhesive that can reduce the

heterogeneity. A development of this kind would undoubtedly increase the

specific power of the States-promoters, such as Iran or Saudi Arabia1.

Many analysts believe that the issue of "green corridor" has not at the time an actual

strategic impact in the regions; on the other Balkan it is considered appropriate to

examine individually the geopolitical weight of individual Islamic communities.

It is important, in fact, focus on the Albanian question in Kosovo and Macedonia;

it is the one with the highest potential for destabilization in the area. In fact, after the

riots of May 10th in Kumanovo (north of Macedonia) between police forces and

extremist groups of the independent Albanian, the country fell into a spiral of protests

against the central government, accused of being a corrupt and authoritarian and that

it has established the wiretaps against as many as 20 thousand citizens, in particular,

diplomats, journalists and politician.

1 Rivista Italiana di Intelligence, Per Aspera ad Veritatem, Geopolitica dei Musulmani, n. 4.

Source: flickrhivemind.net

July 2015


The political crisis in

Macedonia has requested the

intervention of the

Commissioner for

Enlargement and European

Neighbourhood Policy, who

has pushed the government

in Skopje to hold early

elections to be held in April

2016.

In light of these

considerations, it can be noted that the riots broke out in Macedonia at the end of May

are due to two sets of factors.

The first is inter-ethnic clashes provoked by groups Albanian nationalists to pursue

the creation of a Greater Albania; the second endogenous factor regards the opposition

to the government of Gruevski, accused of authoritarianism and corruption.

It can be noted that Islamic fundamentalism is not the real problem for the stability

of Macedonia and the Balkan Peninsula in general; the Islamic fundamentalism could

be the result of popular discontent against the political leaders and the increase of

nationalist clashes, which have already led the Balkan peninsula to pay a blood tribute

in the past.

Source: tribune.gr

July 2015


The Western Balkans: another challenge for European energy

integration

By Francesco Angelone

The Western Balkan countries1 represent indeed an interesting case study when you decide to

analyze the role of energy both as a foreign policy issue and as a foreign policy instrument. Their

geographical position and their energy balance constitute two important standpoints from which to

address the energy security issue, interpreted as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an

affordable price . Reliability and affordability look like necessary, but not sufficient conditions to reach

the energy security, also considered as the economic and environmental sustainability of those supplies.

Time is the other dimension to take into account when you talk about energy security: long-term plans

are only possible by investing in energy supply so to anticipate economic developments; whereas, short-

term energy security is the ability of the energy system to react promptly to sudden changes like energy

shortages.

Energy exporting states use their natural resources as a foreign policy tool,

threatening embargos or promising cheaper supply in return for political concessions.

Importers or transit states also can use their coercion to further soft power objectives

through political sanctions and economic embargos2. In this perspective, relations

between exporters and importers states are another factor to take into account and the

current geopolitical tensions have heightened the risks of disruptions given that the

majority of Russian gas and oil supplies have to transit Ukraine3. And Western Balkans

seems particularly vulnerable vis-à-vis Russia, the main European (and Balkan) gas and

oil supplier.

The geopolitical situation

There is no doubt that, when in the last November Moscow decided to cancel South

Stream from its agenda, things for South-Eastern Europe changed (maybe

definitively4). To shield the EU countries, its most important clients, from potential

* Main object of this analysis are the gas transport facilities because of their greater geopolitical relevance. 1 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 2 A. Grigas (2013), The Politics of Energy and Memory between the Baltic States and Russia, Ashgate, Farnham. 3 J. Milatovic, P. Sanfey, The Western Balkans and EU energy security, EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), January 8, 2015, Cfr. http://www.ebrd.com/news/2015/the-western-balkans-and-eu-energy-security-.html. 4 Friday, 8th May 2015 the italian company Saipem announced to have received the request to resume operations for the construction of the offshore pipeline in the Black Sea. http://www.saipem.com/sites/SAIPEM_en_IT/con-side-

July 2015

10 The Western Balkans: another challenge for European energy integration

disruptions that might occur along the Ukrainian pipeline network, Gazprom, together

with its partners in the Balkans and Central Europe, launched the construction of the

South Stream project in 20125. This pipeline was planned to bring Russian gas through

the Black Sea to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Austria, and Greece.

South Stream would have had to transport gas directly from Russia through the

Black Sea to its consumers in the Balkans and part of Central Europe, with plans to

become operational in late 2015. Russian decision to take down the project was mainly

driven by pressures including western sanctions following to the Ukrainian crisis and

by EU regulations (especially the so-called Third Energy Package which confirms the

principle of guaranteeing third-party access to transit infrastructures and the

unbundling of production and selling phase for a vertically integrated company)6. As a

consequence of the stop, the negotiations between Russia and Turkey for the

realization of Turkish Stream, a gas pipeline that would travel through Turkey7, seemed

to gain momentum. It is quite interesting to notice that this pipeline, for its first half,

has the same route as the South Stream pipeline, making it appear the result of political

considerations more than economic ones.

dx/Press%20releases/2015/Saipem%20update%20on%20the%20South%20Stream%20Transport%20contract.page. 5 A. Cohen, How East-West Competition Turned Balkan Energy into a Geopolitical Football, Journal of Energy Security, November 20, 2014, Cfr.: http://ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=563:how-east-west-competition-turned-balkan-energy-into-a-geopolitical-football&catid=126:kr&Itemid=395. 6 For certain observers the demise of South Stream means that Russia’s long-term threat to bypass the Ukrainian gas transit system is on hold and that Gazprom is going down by losing its political cachet. See D. Bechev, A. Wilson, “Gazprom is going down”, Politico.eu, 2015, 8th May, Internet: http://www.politico.eu/article/gazprom-going-down-russia-sanctions/. 7 Turkish Stream will deliver Russian gas to Turkey and onwards to Europe via the Black Sea.

South Stream pipeline

Source: Gazprom

July 2015


In this ‘cold war’ scenario between EU and Putin’s Russia, Turkey and Greece can

truly become the hub between Moscow and the European gas market. For Turkey, the

new alliance with Russia seems to match with Erdogan’s recent re-evaluation of

relations with the EU8. In this period of tense relations with Brussels, energy sources

and routes can play as a leverage vis-à-vis the European Union. Although Turkey will

be more dependent from Russian gas with this agreement, it will also receive 6%

discount on gas, thus enhancing its importance as an energy hub. It’s quite clear that

Erdogan wants to turn Turkey in a regional energy center for the transportation of

Azeri, Turkmen, Iraqi, Iranian and Mediterranean natural gas as well9.

Greece10, on the other hand, is the last side of this geopolitical triangle. Putin

himself, in a joint press conference with the recently elected Greek Prime Minister

Alexis Tsipras, declared that Turkish Stream could allow Greece to become one of the main

power distribution centers on the continent, and could help attract significant investment into the Greek

8 B. Orucoglu, “The Tsar Meets the Sultan”, Foreign Policy, 2014, 4th December, Internet: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/04/the-tsar-meets-the-sultan-turkey-russia/. Erdogan also stated that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security partnership between Russia, China, and several post-Soviet states, is better and more powerful than the EU. 9 I. Gurbanov, “In search of new partners: Putin’s Turkish Stream for Turkey”, Natural Gas Europe, 2015, 11th February, Internet: http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/new-partners-putin-turkish-stream-turkey. 10 Greece is not actually a Western Balkan country but is considered in this paper as a relevant case study.

Turkish Stream pipeline

Source: Gazprom

http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/12/04/the-tsar-meets-the-sultan-turkey-russia/

July 2015


economy11, that is what the country seems to need most nowadays. Putin courtship to Greece is clearly

a strategic move to find a way out during a phase that seems to mark a slow downfall in Russian

leverage over European countries. As Greece needs credit, and both these countries are

interested in protecting their economic mutual interests12, this bond generates some

concern in the European chancelleries. According to what some Greek government

officials reported to the press, Russia is considering giving Greece funds based on

future profits that Athens would earn from shipping gas to Europe and leaving Greece

pay back the prepayment after the pipeline starts operating13. It would be a clear signal

of how geopolitics does really influence economic evaluations.

In this heavily heated context, another project, the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline could

act as a game changer in the region. This pipeline, which is designed to bring in around

10 bcma of natural gas from Azerbaijan via the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas (TANAP)

pipeline (whose realization began in March), Greece and Albania, and across the

Adriatic Sea to Italy, could finally put some Balkan countries in the strategically

favorable condition to become transit states. Both these pipelines will be linked with

the South Caucasus Pipeline, supplying Turkey and Georgia with gas from the Caspian

11 Russia Today, Turkish Stream will make Greece Europe’s energy hub, April 8, 2014, Cfr. http://rt.com/business/247973-turkish-stream-greece-hub/. 12 F. Angelone, “Greece: if the revolution comes from East”, Mediterranean Affairs, March 26, 2015, Cfr. http://www.mediterraneanaffairs.com/en/events/greece-tsipras-germany-austerity-reforms-russia-putin.html. 13 Russia Today, Turkish Stream will make Greece Europe’s energy hub, April 18, 2015.

TAP/TANAP pipeline

Source: Oil&Gas Journal

http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395237788509&pagename=EBRD%2FContent%2FContentLayout

July 2015


basin14 and prove how much reliable could the Turkish supplies be in the years to come.

TAP capacity (from 10 bcm to 20 bcm) should be the same as Nabucco15, the pipeline

which was planned to transit through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria

to bring Azeri gas to Central European countries but whose project received a

shutdown. Greece and Turkey, once again, are gaining momentum on the international

stage. Albania, which should also host a storage facility, is involved in another project:

the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline (IAP). IAP is planned to link Albania to the LNG plant of

Krk through Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to cover the Western

Balkan region as a whole.

Future challenges

The Western Balkans need to rebuild their energy systems in the name of reliability,

sustainability and efficiency and they can only do that by integrating their national

strategies. Reforms must include a separation of the functions of policy making,

regulation and ownership. Just like in other small European countries that are net

energy importers (e.g. the Baltic States) the creation of an integrated regional market is

the only path these countries can take towards a partial energy enfranchisement. But

how to achieve this goal?

A solution could be the realization of the LNG terminal in Krk, Croatia, a project

supported by the European Union. LNG terminals seem to be the most viable solution

to diversify the sources of supply since they guarantee the import by LNG ship carriers

from several countries and private companies. This project seems now more realistic

than in recent years because of the geopolitical tensions that are affecting Eastern

Europe. Once again, as it has happened in other regions (e.g. Baltic States), EU prefers

to allocate funds for facilities which can improve the situation of a region as a whole,

so to make its assignments more efficient and effective. Krk LNG plant should have a

capacity of 15 billion cubic meters per annum (bcma), about five times the Croatian

annual consumption. These two figures already give the measure of the importance this

facility could have for the Western Balkans. Pipeline connections with countries like

Hungary and Slovenia (already available) or with other countries of the Adriatic region

(to do) can constitute a new gas-trading hub at the core of this geopolitical area. The

Ionian Adriatic Pipeline, still to be realized, is certainly an excellent solution for these

countries and would represent, if TAP project is to be achieved, a great opportunity to

seize.

14 A. Cohen, How East-West Competition Turned Balkan Energy into a Geopolitical Football, Journal of Energy Security, November 20, 2014. 15 Nabucco would have undermined the importance of two Russian lines, through Ukraine (Druzhba pipeline) and Nord Stream (through the Baltic Sea).

July 2015


But the lack of financings, difficult political agreements and the persistence of

obscure decision-making processes in these countries still play as delaying factors.

Moreover, the Western Balkan countries are at different stages along the path of

European integration and they each hold varying energy and environmental standards

and targets. The pace of alignment with EU practices and legislation within the region,

especially at the level of electricity/gas market liberalization and interconnectivity and

regulatory/market transformations, leaves much to be desired16. Of course, internal

regulation will play a key role in the opening of these countries to the international

energy market. The Western Balkan countries, in fact, also made massive efforts to be

accepted in the Energy Community, whose treaty calls for the contracting parties to

implement the relevant EU energy acquis communautaire, in order to develop an adequate

regulatory framework and to liberalize their energy markets.

The removal of political barriers to closer multilateral integration is a fundamental

step that the Western Balkan countries need to take. The political fragmentation has

way too long prevented these countries to shape a common regional energy policy17

and to be recognized as equal partners.

16 CSIS, Re-linking the Western Balkans: The energy dimension, CSIS-EKEM Policy Report 3, Cfr: http://www.transconflict.com/2010/09/re-linking-the-western-balkans-the-energy-dimension-309/. 17 J. Popov, Bringing South East Europe’s Energy Markets Together, Balkan Insight, October, 2014, Cfr: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bringing-south-east-europe-s-energy-markets-together.

http://www.transconflict.com/2010/09/re-linking-the-western-balkans-the-energy-dimension-309/

July 2015


Montenegro, the Adriatic Sea and Western Balkans. Interview with His

Excellency Antun Sbutega

Ed. By Marcello Ciola

We are glad to be here with His Excellency Antun Sbutega, Ambassador of

Montenegro in Italy, and we thank him for this interview. He is going to speak

about his Country in a Mediterranean and Balkan perspective. Starting from a

general question: what does the Adriatic Sea represent for Montenegro in a

cultural, historical and economic point of view?

Montenegro, as you know, is an Adriatic country, which means that it is

Mediterranean and Balkan at the same time; it is a small country with about 300

kilometers of coast between Albania

and Croatia. Throughout the history of

Montenegro, this stretch of coast has

been the essential part of the territory:

as for all Western Balkans countries, a

mountain range divides the coast from

the inland without natural passages as

rivers or valleys. Therefore, the coast is

the key through which you can write the

history of Mediterranean, European

(think, for example to relations with

Italy) and Balkan relations of

Montenegro. The coast is where the first

cities were founded and it still remains

the busiest part of the country that

"breathes" through the maritime

connections that favored the arrival of foreign populations that have occupied the

territory. Indeed, Montenegro was made independent 5 times during its history: the

first time in 1042 and the last in 2006 (the only time that the independence process was

conducted in a peaceful, democratic and without weapons). In the past, each occupant

country has had its economic and political core on the coast because of the

inaccessibility of inland. This meant that the economy developed through maritime

trade and fishing. In modern times, it has also focused heavily on tourism and maritime

exploration on the seabed for the presence of oil or gas fields. Therefore, for

Montenegro, the Adriatic is an essential element in cultural, historical and economic

terms.

Source: Wikipedia

July 2015

16 Montenegro, the Adriatic Sea and Western Balkans. Interview with His Excellency Antun Sbutega

Today, how are going the relations with Italy and Adriatic neighbors about

the division and exploitation of territorial water?

About relations with Italy, I can say that they are very good, not only in the last 9

years, from a cultural and political point of view, but also from the economic one: Italy

is the first investor in Montenegro. With other neighbors, there are excellent economic

and political relations too. As I said, the Adriatic Sea is a sort of Mediterranean Gulf

and, so, European. For this reason, good relations between Adriatic countries are

essential for regional stability and prosperity. We know this especially from the

beginning of Yugoslav Wars. Since 2000, the process of good relations evolved year

after year: Slovenia and Croatia are NATO and EU member as well as Greece. Albania

is candidate for membership in the EU and it is a NATO member. Montenegro is going

toward the same direction of integration in the euro-Atlantic bloc. Maybe, within the

end of 2016 we will receive the invitation to get NATO membership. We make great

strides toward the EU membership that we expect will arrive within a few years.

Therefore, the Adriatic Sea became the place where different international issues are

discussed and regulated: we can mention the issues that I said before, but we can’t go

on without mentioning the exploit of maritime resources. For example, Italy is carrying

out an important role in this issue: ENI, which is collaborating with Croatia, is closing

an exploration and exploitation contract with Montenegro. Furthermore, in

collaboration with Terna S.p.A., Montenegro starting the construction of an undersea

electric cable which will run from Italy to Montenegro and will integrate the two

electrical energy systems, to expand in the future this integration to the whole western

Balkans. The same collaboration is taking place in sectors such as tourism, fishing and

others.

Italy-Montenegro Power Line

Source: vijesti.me

July 2015


We can argue that International, Regional and Economic policies of

Montenegro go through Adriatic and Mediterranean Sea.

Yes, it is. As mentioned, Montenegro is a small market (620,000 inhabitants) and

although it is a very dynamic country economically, in respect of the rest of Europe it

is still in an immature stage of development. Some small ports are under development,

especially with regard to the landing of mega-yacht to promote luxury tourism. I refer

to the Bay of Kotor, where there have been strong foreign investment, or the port of

Bar1 which is the biggest of Montenegro and of that part of the Adriatic (with an annual

transport capacity of around 6.5 million tons) but not exploited enough because the

inland connections, especially with Serbia and the rest of Eastern Europe, are very

scarce: there are only one outdated railway built in 1976 and a very old four-lane road.

There are projects to build a more modern railway and the construction of a major

highway has begun that will give a great boost to Montenegrin and Balkan economies.

The Port of Bar is strategically located because it is situated closer to the western

Mediterranean over its main competitors then the ports of the Black Sea and of

Thessaloniki. Therefore, on this basis the Economic Plan of Montenegro is developing.

Changing topic, in relation to the outbreak of the so-called Arab Springs,

what is the political position of Montenegro? It is suffering the migration

phenomenon?

As you know, Balkans have an important strategic position and everything that

happens both in the Mediterranean and in Eastern Europe cannot fail to affect and

influence this territory. Therefore, both the Arab Springs and Ukraine or Greek Crisis,

had a negative influence on Balkans stability. For example, the immigration

phenomenon heavily affected Italy, Greece, Malta and the Balkans (especially Serbia in

regards to the transit migration). However, when we speak of Montengro,

consequences were not so negative. Because of the small and arduous territory, only

few immigrants pass through Montenegro. Another problem is that of foreign fighters.

Although it is a very sensitive issue in the Balkan Peninsula because of the strong

Muslim presence, in Montenegro there were only very few cases, also limited by an

effective anti-terror law. A very popular problem is the tension between Russia and the

EU, and with all the countries of that area, not for economic reasons but for political

interests. In fact, for centuries, in the area of Montenegro the different interests from

Europe and from the East have been intertwined. I speak of the relationship between

Byzantium and the so-called barbarians who invaded the West Roman Empire, or

between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers, up to the relations between

EU/NATO and the Russian Federation. Although there isn’t the danger of clashes in

1 That Italians calls Antivari (or Antibari) because it is located in front of the Apulian city of Bari.

July 2015

18 Montenegro, the Adriatic Sea and Western Balkans. Interview with His Excellency Antun Sbutega

this region, tensions are perceived clearly. Montenegro has chosen integration into the

Western bloc (despite some internal opposition) while maintaining good political and

economic relations with the Russian Federation. I would stress that our relations with

Russia are very intense. Moscow is one of the first investors in Montenegro and there

is a historical continuity of good political relations above all due to cultural aspects.

Montenegro is the only country in the Balkans that is has both a Slav and Orthodox

majority and this was one of the fundamental aspects of good relations with Russia

since the days of Peter the Great. No one in Montenegro plans to deny the

Montenegrin history and damage these good relations with Russia. This may or may

not please Russia, Brussels or Washington, but Montenegro has decided to take this

path of integration in the “Western civilization” while maintaining this kind of relations

to the countries of the East.

Well, the questions are over, thank you again on behalf of the Think Tank

Mediterranean Affairs, and we hope to meet you again.

Thank you for this interview.

Source: Direct Travel

July 2015


Greece in a European and Mediterranean point of view. Interview

with Prof. Francesco Anghelone.

Ed. By Marcello Ciola and Francesca Azzarà

Prof. Anghelone, how much do you think Greece managed to elaborate a strategy

of foreign policy in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean notwithstanding its

economic situation?

Greece played a role in the Balkans, especially in the closet countries (Albania, Serbia,

Romania and Bulgaria), since the war in Yugoslavia. Its activity entailed first the Greek

banks’ acquisition of local ones and, then, the involvement in the telecommunications

sector through the OTE, the public telephony society, which after the crisis passed under

the control of the Deutsche Telekom.

Until Greece had

had an apparently good

economic situation, it

was able to pursue a

policy of expansion in

the Balkans’ markets

where Greece played a

role of micro regional

power, thanks to the

dreadful economic

moment that the

countries within the

region where

experiencing after the

collapse of Yugoslavia.

Instead, Greece’s foreign policy has been put in a stand-by mode since 2009. The

approach to Russia was mainly due to economic issues and it is extremely unlikely that

Greece leaves its European economic and financial partners to bound further with Russia

economically and strategically. Nonetheless, this is no 100% sure given that, in the event

of the so called ‘Grexit’ or of a Greek bankrupt, the country could be more eager to move

towards the Russian side by means of energy policies. Just think of the recently concluded

agreement to build in the north of Greece of a piece of the pipeline substituting the South

Stream. In case, the relations would deepen into both the economic and political domain.

Furthermore, Greece is one of those who are suffering economically the most from the

European sanctions to Russia, especially in agriculture exports. On the Turkish front,

instead, relations have been stabilising for some time already, since the Simitis’

government (1996-2004), when Giorgios Papandreu was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Surce: notizie.it

July 2015

20 Greece in a European and Mediterranean point of view. Interview with Prof. Francesco Anghelone.

(1999-2004) during the ‘heart-quakes diplomacy’: two violent heartquakes hit Turkey on

August 1999 and Greece in September 1999 and the two countries helped each other and,

consequently, started reconnecting diplomatically. The interstate relations, previously at

odds, stepped up further even under the administration of Kostas Karamanlis. Nowadays,

you can see some of the ‘leftovers’ of the commercial expansion carried out during the ‘90s

in the Balkans, although it is not taking off. If in that region the Greek presence is still

considerable, its control has de facto slipped under German control. In brief, Greece had

the opportunity to benefit from the European Enlargement in the Balkans, provided that at

that time it was the only country with a rising economy, a stable political system and huge

investments on the defense. That opportunity evanished consequently the current economic

situation. Despite these

difficulties, the

government is trying to

maintain its position in

the area, as

demonstrated by the

recent tour of the Greek

Minister of Foreign

Affair, Nikos Kotzias,

in several Countries of

the area1. The Balkans

are affected by, even if

just partially, by the

diplomatic conflict on

the Republic of

Macedonia (FYROM),

against it Athens put an

embargo during the

‘90s.

Thus, given the current crisis, is Greece suffering (likewise many Balkan states)

also the centrifugal ethnical pressure? How much the idea of a Great Albania– that is

an economic union really in expansion in western Balkans- is influencing the ethnic

minorities in Greece?

Actually, Greece experienced a different and opposed movement when the wall fell.

The existence of several Greek minorities in Albania, namely in the region that Greeks

called the Northern Epirus, was used by some political factions to claim some Albanian

territories. Nonetheless, the Greek government did not support such requests. As for the

internal domain, there were no bug issues; sin ever since the beginning of the ‘90s, the

1From 24 to 26 June, Mr. Kotzias carried out visits to the capitals of the countries of the Western Balkans (Skopje, 24 June; Belgrade, 26 June; Podgorica, 26 June).

Greek and Macedonian Ministries of Foreign Affairs (Nikola Kotzias and

Nikolom Popovskim)

Source: Aljazeera

July 2015


Albanian ethnic minority, which is one of the largest in Greece, integrated very well inside

the Greek society and labour force: many Albanian had stable jobs in the constructions

domain and in the restaurant business and the Albanian immigration did not ever

constituted a problem. Certainly, sometimes both the communities from Albania, Africa

and the Middle east were charged for some micro-criminality events like drug trafficking.

This type of phenomena particularly upturned subsequently to the economic crisis and

provoked the recent rise in popularity of Golden Dawn, a political formation famous for its

xenophobia and nationalistic slogans.

The Albanian communities are not coming back from Greece to Albania where

the economy is going better?

Who lost his job or had the possibility to do it, came back to Albania. Nowadays, the

Albanian community is the one, which has experienced the most the phenomenon of the

return thanks to the geographical proximity and the political and economic stability of the

country of origin. Notwithstanding this advantages, the phenomenon has not been as

massive as that concerning Italy during the ‘90s where the Albanian community is deeply

integrated.

We also talked about FYROM. How are relationships going with this country,

taking into consideration the EU enlargement? Are they regaining momentum or are

they still rigid?

The controversy concerning the name of the

FYROM is ongoing; negotiations at the UN level are

being carried out but no solution has been reached yet.

The dispute has been radicalised and faced kind of

brutally in Greece especially in the ‘90s, when in

Athens’ buses you could spot stickers with the

following sentence written upon them: I

Makedoníaeínai Elláda, that is “Macedonia is

Greece”. From 1990 to 1993 New Democracy ran the

government and Samaras, at that time Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, had to resign because of his rigid

position towards FYROM. In fact, his idea of an embargo contemporarily to the war in ex-

Yugoslavia created a series of problems. The issue is nowadays quite complex and two-

folded. On the one hand, we are talking about a region that so important to Greece that the

government established a Minister for Macedonia, whose capital, Salonika, is considered

a sort of second capital for Greece and played a special role in the country’s history. On

the other hand, we can hear people talking a lot about Alexander the Great and Philip of

Macedonia who were both considered Greek and Macedon and founders of the country.

That implied a political problem. FYROM wanted to use as a symbol for its flag the Sun

Vergina Sun

Source: pinterest.com

July 2015


of Vergìna2, which Greece considers one of its most important historical attributes. After a

series of diplomatic attempts to settle the dispute, FYROM decided eventually to use a

stylised sun as a symbol, which highly resembles to the Sun of Vergina. For Greeks,

instead, ‘Macedonia’ stands for an historical and nationally meaningful region within their

territory. The colour of governments evidently influences the way the issue is addressed

and stressed. Nonetheless, it is always important to Greeks. Among the Greek parties,

Syriza could be the one able to erase the issue from the political agenda, but I am afraid at

the moment Tsipras has other problems to deal with. Not to mention the unlikelihood that

the Party of the Independent Greeks will make concessions.

We mentioned the migration flows. How much do you think Greece is being

affected by the phenomenon compared with Italy or Turkey?

According to the numbers, Greek is suffering as much as Italy in terms of arrivals even

though the Greek population is littler and the economy is weaker than the Italian is. Then

other issues add to the migration waves. First, both in Italy and Greece there are no

sufficient means to cope with the emergency; second, immigrations are difficult to be

handled during an economic crisis of such proportions. Second, resulting to a reduction in

the GDP of 25%, poverty and unemployment are rising and the arrival of these migrants is

exploited as a political weapon for gathering consensus by populist, nationalist and

xenophobia parties like Golden Dawn. That brings us to the third point that is the way

Europe is handling the economic crisis in Greece. The ‘Austerity’ approach spurred the

Greeks disaffection to the European Union and the perception of the Germans as enemies

because of their rigidity towards Greece. What the Greeks perceive is that, while they are

forced to abide by the diktats of the EU institutions, the other EU MS do not share with

Greece the burden of the migration waves. Thus, the situation is likely to split further the

EU along the North-South cleavage and is favouring the rise in popularity – as stated above-

of some populist parties like Golden Dawn in Greece or Lega Nord and Movimento 5 Stelle

in Italy, which exploit these issues during their electoral campaigns to collect popular

consensus.

Do migrants see Greece as a country of destination or of transit?

As for Italy, Greece is perceived as a country of transition towards the north of Europe.

The problem, differently from the Italian case3, is that migrants often debark into small

isles, which are scarcely populated, far from the continent and, often, very close to Turkey.

There, the controls are not that tight as the Turkish government aims to foster the

immigrants’ departure from its territory. Thus, besides the social implications, the situation

is very difficult to manage from a logistic point of view.

2 The symbol was discovered into the tomb of Philip II of Macedonia, in Vergina. 3Made exception for the isle of Lampedusa.

July 2015


The last question on Greece’s relations with China. How much the Chinese

investments on the Piraeus advantage or disadvantage Greece?

China has been advantaged from the investments since it paid through the COSCO an

estimated € 4.5/5 billion to get the administration of two quays of the Piraeus over a 40-

years period of time. Thus, considering the range of time, one can certainly state that china

made a great deal which is transforming the quays, the most active in the Port, in hubs for

it’s the products and for those of multinational companies. Just to make an example, the

Hewlett-Packard choose port to bring its products to Europe and to the Mediterranean while

the COSCO is seeking to conclude agreements with some other important multinationals.

At the same time, china is seeking to launch a very commercially appetizing project, that

is the creation of a RETE FERRIOVIARIA connecting THE Piraeus port to the Greek main

network and brining the goods and manufactures to the markets of central and northern

Europe. So far, the economic benefit for Greece has been minimum. It received a lot of

liquidity but could not solve that much with that. Furthermore, the Chinese investments

managed to maintain the Greek

labour force, but at worse

condition though. Last July the

COSCO workers went on strike

as they were forced to work more

than 12 hours a day. Moreover,

there were only two people

instead of the required three

working on the crane; indeed,

COSCO made them sign a private

declaration in which they

promised not to call an

ambulance in case of a sinister but

to go to the hospital by themselves in order not to make evident they got injured in the

workplace.

A series of condition that demonstrate how easy a country in difficulty like Greece can

be easily ‘ruled’ by the economic giant, like China, which pays low salaries and imposes

working conditions well below the European standards.

The other important question to consider is the European position. The EU has already

launched two rescue plans for Greece, respectively of €110 billion and of €130billion,

which is a lot more money compared with the Chinese investments. Nonetheless, it is

questionable why the EU did not invest it to make the Piraeus a hub for its goods. That is,

in my opinion, a mistake that the EU made given that it left a blank space for the Chinese

expansion in the Balkans (where usually the Germans did business) and, hypothetically, to

other areas where it can challenge the German commercial predominance. Given that the

Chinese investments are making their way from sub-Saharan Africa to Northern Africa, it

Source: The Loadstar

July 2015


is not impossible to envision a scenario

in which China take political and

economic control of the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, Peking, compared to the

EU Member States, benefits from the

fact that the large companies like

COSCO are controlled by the State and,

thus, respond to both political and

economic logics. That is evident from

the approach adopted by the ZTE and

Huawei, which have equally divided

the share of the telecommunication

market so as not to compete with one

another. Thus, we can certainly state

that there is a political strategy in the

economic expansion of China. The

other project, which the Chinese are investing on, is the port authority. The previous Greek

government foresaw the privatisation of the authority. Tsipras initially blocked it but then

approved it. At the moment, the authority is still public but the privatisation should be

realised as soon as an agreement with the institutions is reached. In the event of a Chinese

acquisition of the authority, that will cause a ‘commercial hole’ allowing the indiscriminate

flow into the region of Chinese goods, which are very cheap but characterised by security

standards well below the European threshold. Thus, the problem is mainly commercial.

The EU risks to be invaded by an economic giant in the Mediterranean, where the

Europeans should be investing to spur their economic growth instead.

What will be the outcome of the confrontation between Tsipras government and

international creditors?

After the referendum called by the Greek government, positions seem to get closer. The

government, negotiating

with creditors, must take

into account the electoral

program through which it is

presented to voters -

definitely against the

austerity policies - and the

position of the minority

inside Syriza, Left

Platform. This force has to

mediate constantly between

the creditors' claims,

sometimes quite harsh, and Source: Micromega

The strategic importance of Greece (railroads)

Source: The Economist

July 2015


the necessity to keep its majority unite. For this reason, Tsipras decided to call the

referendum. The vote rewarded his choice, but several statistical surveys of the last few

weeks also show that, to date, the majority of Greeks want to stay in the euro. Therefore,

the victory of the “no” at the referendum served primarily to strengthen Greek approval

for Tsipras - it is a clear victory on all oppositions supporting the "yes" option - and at the

same time launched a signal to creditors about the general consensus that the Greek Prime

Minister still enjoys. Above all, Tsipras put at the center of the political debate the issue of

debt sustainability, the real question that now prevents a possible long-term solution of the

crisis in the country. Having silenced domestic opposition and strengthened himself in the

eyes of the creditors, Tsipras has been able to sit at the negotiating table from a boldest

position. His latest proposals seem to meet the demands of creditors and bode well against

a possible deal, although this will also depend very much on the attitude that will adopt

Germany and her fellow countries, which held the harder line against Greece in recent

weeks. Then, a win-win solution, from the Greek side, should include the acceptance of

some of the more unpalatable requests presented by creditors. Instead, from the latter’s

side, it should include the serious commitment to tackle the issue of Greek debt

restructuring in a reasonable time.

July 2015

26 Conclusions

Conclusions

The drafting of this dossier has not been easy at all. As can be seen just by reading the

title, the area of the Western Balkans is an extremely active area and “unstable”. From a

political point of view, the area is undergoing yet the disastrous consequences of the ‘90s

wars, resulting of much ancient divisions and multiple political interests that yonder meet

and often collide. The northern part has

a Central European identity and turns

its gaze to the north rather than to the

east or south. The most affected by

political cleavages is the one that begins

in Sarajevo and arrives in Athens. In

this area, even the boundaries between

states seem to be well established and

the weight of ethnic and religious

minorities is felt in an important way.

We refer especially to the Albanian

minorities or Muslim ones (the two

minorities often coincide) but it is also

important to mention all those ethnic

groups who live beyond the borders of

their States, constituting ethnic

communities in other States (and

Italians in Croatia, the Bulgarians in

Serbia, Montenegro and the Serbs in

Bosnia, the Vlachos ect.). In this constantly changing reality, it is impossible to describe a

political situation in a static way and it is very difficult to make accurate predictions about

what might happen within the next five years. Examples are what is going on in Macedonia1

or what is evolving in Greece after the referendum on the austerity policies required by

Brussels, Berlin and Frankfurt to Athens. This last case, fully examined by Professor

Francesco Anghelone in his interview, shows how Greece is representing a great challenge

for the EU both in relation to its economic policies and for managing the problem of

migration in the Mediterranean Sea. The threat of small jihadist groups, as pointed out by

Dr. Durante, is also another important challenge that acts on one hand as an important

logistics base for the training and the transfer of guerrillas to North Africa and the Middle

1 After the attacks and clashes in Kumanovo between groups of Kosovo Liberation Army veterans and police, in the capital Skopje protests broke out against the management policy of the Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, judged too much authoritarian and corrupt from a part of population.

Source: Bergbookk

July 2015


East, on the other to increase the risk of social chaos and political instability throughout the

Balkans.

Therefore, although in essence it is a scenario of political crisis and, in some respects,

even economic, the Western Balkans continue to play their historic role of laboratory of

international politics. Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, this area suffers political,

cultural and economic influence that come from several parts of the world. Being a

“laboratory of international politics” means certainly that governments and peoples

suffering instability, but it also means you can take advantage of different opportunities,

mainly economic ones. These opportunities are mainly related to major energy contracts

(which are part of an international Great Game) and to fruitful commercial traffics that

from the west and south go to the east and vice versa. Starting from the energy issue, the

United States and its allies have an interest in stopping the expansion of Gazprom in the

Balkans. Russia is forced, as was in the case of South Stream, to cancel contracts with

Western companies (with large losses for the latter) and having to build a new gas pipeline

project, as the new Turkish Stream. This kind of issues were excellently faced by Dr.

Angelone, who also points out that this Great Game is not only a source of profit for

Russian and Western Oil-Companies but also a good source of income for the Countries

through which these pipelines pass. The Balkans, as a territory of passage, can exploit in

their favor this geopolitical scenario2. Although it is not an easy area to cross and, in some

2 Greece has adopted a similar strategy on the financial issue: while dealing with the European Union, continuing its excellent relations with Russia and the BRICS. The United States is extremely concerned about losing influence in Athens because of the inflexibility of the ECB and the Commission.

Surce: Statistical Guide

July 2015

28 Conclusions

places, quite insecure, the Western Balkans are also a commercial crossroad. Implementing

the commercial hubs, especially air and maritime transports is the biggest challenge of

economic policy for these countries. As pointed out by Ambassador Sbutega, Montenegro

has taken this challenge to make a growth opportunity for the country, a small country that,

without being politically oppressed, is able to maintain the right balance between relations

with Brussels and Moscow. It seems that from these small national communities, linked to

strong historical and/or cultural identities, the Balkans are trying to start up again, using,

among many difficulties, their big opportunity to improve their prosperity and stability.

Marcello Ciola

Vice-CEO of Mediterranean Affairs

July 2015


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Cohen A., How East-West Competition Turned Balkan Energy into a Geopolitical

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.html.

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reality&catid=2:world-politics.

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of Vienna, May 26, 2009. http://gatesofvienna.blogspot.it/2009/05/green-corridor-

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July 2015

30 Authors

Authors

Francesco Angelone. MA in International Relations at the LUISS Guido Carli

University in Rome with a thesis on the role of energy in the international relations of

the Baltic States. He is currently attending a Master Course in Parliament and Public

Policies at LUISS School of Government in Rome. Editorial Board member of

Mediterranean Affairs.

Francesco Anghelone. MA in History of Eastern Europe at the Faculty of

Leterature and Philosophy, University “La Sapienza” of Rome. Later he obtained a

doctorate in European History at the Faculty of Political Science, University “La

Sapienza” of Rome. Since 2005, he is the Coordinator of the historical and political

research area of the Institute of Political Studies “S. Pio V”. He has collaborated with

several Italian and foreign universities, including the University Luiss Guido Carli, “La

Sapienza” of Rome, the University of Athens and the University of Thessaloniki. He is

the Manager Editor of “Rivista di Studi Politici” (Scientific Journal of Political Studies)

and contributor to Aspenia Online. He is the author of essays and books of historical

and geopolitical related to the Mediterranean. Among his most recent publications,

Geopolitical Atlas of the Mediterranean 2014 (ed. with Prof. A. Ungari), and The Troika

on the Acropolis, Bordeaux Editions.

Giorgia Durante. MA in International and Comunitarian Law at the Faculty of

Law, at Luiss Guido Carli University of Rome, with a thesis entitled War crimes,

superior responsibility and order execution. Since January to June 2014, she worked at the UN

headquarter (N.Y) for UNDESA Department. In July 2015, she started to work in a

legal office in Lecce.

H. M. Antun Sbutega. Ambassador of the Republic of Montenegro in Italy.

Former Ambassador of the Republic of Montenegro to the Holy See. Professor at the

University of Montenegro. He collaborate with other universities and cultural

associations, trying to contribute to the democratization and development of

Montenegro and the consolidation of its ties with Europe and Italy. He was a member

of the Movement for the independence of Montenegro. He collaborates with the chair

of the History of Eastern Europe at the Faculty of Political Science, University “La

Sapienza”. For Rubbettino, in 2006, he published History of Montenegro.

Special Thanks to Domus Europa and Identità Europea, partners of

Mediterranean Affairs, for helping to realization of this Dossier.

July 2015


Ed. Mediterranean Affairs®.

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Documents

Dossier #2 - Western Balkans