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Articles: a114 Date Published: 10/9/2002 www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=348 Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, Editors Hyper-Heidegger  Arthur Kroker Uncanny Thinking Martin Heidegger is the theorist par excellence of the digital future. Probably because Heidegger's was a deeply embittered vision of the ruins of modernity to the extent that he wrote in a spirit of desolation about the "gods having abando ned the earth," retreating back into an impenetrable shroud of "forgetfulness," Heidegger was the one thinker who did not shrink from thinking through to its deepest depths the unfolding horizon of a culture of "pure technicity ." While Heidegger began his writing with a deconstruction of conventional ontology in Being and Time, his lasting gift to the tradition of critical metaphysics was to perform in advance an intense, unforgiving and unremitting deconstruction of his own life in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. [1] After the latter book, having nowhere to go other than to wander in the shadowland between a reflection on Being that in its retreat into forgetfulness was admittedly impossible to concretely realize and a future driven forward by the "will to technicity ," Heidegger was the one thinker who literally deconstructed his own project to a point of self-nihilation. With nothing to save, no hope to dispense, and no critique that did not fall immediately into the dry ashes of cultural cynicism, Heidegger's fate was to make of his own life of thought a simulacrum of the will to technology . More than Marx who remained wedded to the biblical dream of proletarian redemption and more so than Nietzsche who countered the nihilism of the "will to power" with the possibilities of reclaimed human subjects as their own "dancing stars," Heidegger was the one thinker without hope in the dispensations of history. Not broken by the vicissitudes of history , Heidegger was and is the contemporary historical moment. In his thought, the new century is already "overcome" at the very moment of its inception. Not overcome in the sense of abandonment, but overcome to the extent that Heidegger summons up in his thinking the anxieties, fears, and methods of the will to technicity. A futurist without faith, a metaphysician without the will to believe, a philosopher opposed to reason, Heidegger is the perfect representative of the technological trajectory at the outer edge of i ts parabolic curvature through the dark spaces of the post-human future. If it be objected that we should not read Heidegger because of his political complicity with German fascism, I would enter the dissent that Heidegger's momentary harmony , but harmony nonetheless, with the politics of f ascism makes of him a r epresentative guide to the next phase of fascism—virtual fascism. More than liberal critics who fault Heidegger for taking advantage of the fascist upsurge in pre-War Germany to gain a University rectorship as well as to betray his philosophical mentor—Husserl—I would go further, noting that in breaking with National Socialism, Heidegger did not refuse fascism on the grounds of an oppositional political ethics, but because its strictly political determination in the historically specific form of National Socialism in the Germany of the 1930s and 40s was not a

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Articles : a114Date Published : 10/9/2002www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=348Arthur and Marilouise Kroker, Editors

Hyper-Heidegger

Arthur Kroker

Uncanny Thinking

Martin Heidegger is the theorist par excellence of the digital future.

Probably because Heidegger's was a deeply embittered vision of the ruins of modernity tothe extent that he wrote in a spirit of desolation about the "gods having abandoned the

earth," retreating back into an impenetrable shroud of "forgetfulness," Heidegger was theone thinker who did not shrink from thinking through to its deepest depths the unfoldinghorizon of a culture of "pure technicity." While Heidegger began his writing with adeconstruction of conventional ontology in Being and Time , his lasting gift to the tradition of critical metaphysics was to perform in advance an intense, unforgiving and unremittingdeconstruction of his own life in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,Solitude . [1] After the latter book, having nowhere to go other than to wander in theshadowland between a reflection on Being that in its retreat into forgetfulness was admittedlyimpossible to concretely realize and a future driven forward by the "will to technicity,"Heidegger was the one thinker who literally deconstructed his own project to a point of

self-nihilation. With nothing to save, no hope to dispense, and no critique that did not fallimmediately into the dry ashes of cultural cynicism, Heidegger's fate was to make of his ownlife of thought a simulacrum of the will to technology. More than Marx who remained weddedto the biblical dream of proletarian redemption and more so than Nietzsche who counteredthe nihilism of the "will to power" with the possibilities of reclaimed human subjects as their own "dancing stars," Heidegger was the one thinker without hope in the dispensations of history.

Not broken by the vicissitudes of history, Heidegger was and is the contemporary historicalmoment. In his thought, the new century is already "overcome" at the very moment of itsinception. Not overcome in the sense of abandonment, but overcome to the extent thatHeidegger summons up in his thinking the anxieties, fears, and methods of the will totechnicity. A futurist without faith, a metaphysician without the will to believe, a philosopher opposed to reason, Heidegger is the perfect representative of the technological trajectory atthe outer edge of its parabolic curvature through the dark spaces of the post-human future.

If it be objected that we should not read Heidegger because of his political complicity withGerman fascism, I would enter the dissent that Heidegger's momentary harmony, butharmony nonetheless, with the politics of fascism makes of him a representative guide to thenext phase of fascism—virtual fascism. More than liberal critics who fault Heidegger for taking advantage of the fascist upsurge in pre-War Germany to gain a University rectorship

as well as to betray his philosophical mentor—Husserl—I would go further, noting that inbreaking with National Socialism, Heidegger did not refuse fascism on the grounds of anoppositional political ethics, but because its strictly political determination in the historicallyspecific form of National Socialism in the Germany of the 1930s and 40s was not a

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sufficiently "pure" type to fully represent the metaphysical possibility that was the German"folk." [2] For Heidegger, National Socialists were not sufficiently self-consciousmetaphysically, too trapped in the particularities of politics, to be capable finally of realizingthe ontology of the fascist moment: delivering the metaphysical possibilities of (German)folk-community into concrete historical realization. To the tribal consciousness of fascism,Heidegger remained a metaphysician of dasein. Ironically, his prescience concerning thefading away of second-order (National Socialist) fascism before the coming to be of first-order (virtual) fascism ultimately made of his thought a historical incommensurability: toometaphysically pure for the direct action, "hand to mouth" politics of German fascism; andyet too radically deconstructive of the claims of technological rationality to find its home inliberalism. "Homeless thought."

An idealist in the tradition of German nationalism, Heidegger's fate was to be that of thefaithless thinker, ultimately disloyal to German fascism because it was not sufficientlymetaphysical, yet unable to reconcile himself to western liberalism because it was, in hisestimation, the political self-consciousness of technicity. For this reason, Heidegger endedthe war digging ditches, having been ousted by German university authorities acting at the

behest of state fascism as the University of Freiburg's "most dispensable Professor." It isalso for this reason that Heidegger in the post-war period was, except for a brief periodbefore retirement, expelled from university teaching. Always a metaphysician, always intransition to the next historical stage of the "will," always in rebellion against the impurities of compromised philosophical vision, Heidegger's mind was fully attuned to the restlessstirrings of the will as its broke from its twin moorings in ethnic fundamentalism and industrialcapitalism and began to project itself into world-history in the pure metaphysical form of the"will to will." [3] Beyond time and space, breaking through the skin of human culture,respecting no national borders, an "overcoming" that first and foremost overcomes its ownnostalgic yearnings for a final appearance in the theatre of representation, the will to will,what Heidegger would come to call the culture of "pure technicity," was the gleam on thepost-human horizon, and Heidegger was its most faithful reporter. In Heidegger's writings,the main historical trends of the 21st century have their prophet and doomsayer.

Heidegger's mind lies between past and future.

Technology as a "Danger" and a "Saving Power"

If Heidegger could write so eloquently and think so mystically about that which in the presentera is so unmentionable—Being—, if Heidegger could say that Being "comes into presence"in the mode of "enframing," the animating impulse of technology, if he could speak of Beingas containing both a "danger" and a "saving power" and speak evocatively of the "turning" sonecessary to transform the danger into the saving power, perhaps that is becauseHeidegger's thought is itself a "turning," a "lightning-flash" which illuminates human beings tothemselves, and which does so not by surrendering to calculative thinking or by retreating tospurious forms of idealism, but by looking deeply and meditatively into the danger of technology, by "thinking" technology to its roots in metaphysics.

Hyper-Heidegger, then, a thinker who makes of himself both a "danger" and a "saving-power," who makes of the effort of reading Heidegger both a form of "unconcealedness" and

"openness." If Heidegger could dismiss as illusory thinking the pretension that "man hasmastery of technology," claiming instead the opposite that human beings are set in placeas a condition of possibility for the development of technology , [4] if Heidegger could

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only speak of the human essence in terms of its deep entanglement with the question of technology, that is because Heidegger's thought is the "clearing" that he thought he was onlyprophesying. To read Heidegger is not so much a matter of meditating on the "question of technology," but the much more dangerous possibility of becoming entangled with thequestion of Heidegger . Not Heidegger as a historically proximate philosopher with a certainbiography as a determinately local German thinker projecting the "pathways" of the BlackForest onto the "world picture", but Heidegger as that "glancing" taking us immediately intothe dangerous mysteries, not of Being, but of hyper-being , into the impossible metaphysicalclaims of a form of being that only exists in the language of fatal oppositions: calculationversus meditation, world versus earth, ordering versus revealing, business versus art.Refusing the safety of a strictly monistic determination of the question of being, Heidegger was always a hyper-metaphysician, making of being an enigmatic sign, a crossing-over, a"solitude" between the identify of "world" and the difference of "earth." For him,incommensurability is the essence of technology, and hyper-being the song-line of thedeeply conflicting impulses that animate technological destining.

The question of Heidegger necessarily speaks to the human essence. If Heidegger is

correct, the discourse, first of capitalism, then of capitalism in its hyper-phase as virtuality, isthe story of the presencing of hyper-being , with ourselves as both its active participants andnecessary conditions. This is not a story of fatalism or catastrophe, far from it sinceHeidegger claims that the latter are themselves no more than the "historiographical"representations of technological consciousness, but the story of "destining", of learning acertain "comportment towards technology" that draws the saving-power out of the danger of technology. In the strange labyrinth of history, could it be that the question of Heidegger isalso a "turning," a way of looking deeply into the danger as the first tentative steps towardsthe presencing of another destiny of technology. Heidegger went to his death with theconstant admonition that we are "uninterpreted signs." [5] Could it be that interpretingHeidegger is the necessary encryption of the codes of technology, that until now neglectedinterpretation of the "uninterpreted sign" that is digital being? But, if that is so, if Heidegger isthe necessary interpretation of technological destining, then wouldn't that also makeHeidegger's thought a form of "valuing," a will to power projecting itself across the worldpicture in the language of thought? Wouldn't Heidegger's destiny, then, be an artistic one:simultaneously fully implicated in the question of technology while different from it, an artistof the "yes and no?"

Out of place in his time, a thinker sensitive to the loss of the autochthonous in the culture of technicity, Heidegger transformed the language of "rootlessness" [6] into a central premise of the strife in modern subjectivity. For him, the challenge and impossibility of the modern

technical project was its starting-point in "being held out into the nothing." Camus' absurd.The gods have retreated into the shadows. The meaning of technicity lies close at hand, yetremains concealed in the shroud of calculative forgetfulness. No certain past, no actualpresent, only a future-time split open by the animating energy of the will to technology:cultural "rootlessness" as the central feature of modern technical being. Indeed, if contemporary subjectivity can move with such volatility between the "malice of rage" and thesolace of healing, then this would only indicate that strife is the modern language of rootlessness. This, then, is the modern fate: "being held out into the nothing" with no clear way of returning to oneself as an abode or dwelling in proximity to the ancient language of the "holy." [7] And yet if we cannot think of the self as an abode or dwelling, then what

remains is only the desolation of homelessness and its certain result—the "malice of rage".For Heidegger, as earlier for Nietzsche who in On the Genealogy of Morals , spokeevocatively of modern being rubbing itself raw on the bars of "civilized" culture, the "maliceof rage" is the true malignancy of technological culture. That this malignancy can sometimes

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be distracted, even to the point of forgetfulness, in the form of technological exteriorizationsof the human sensorium and, at other times, temporarily appeased in the sacrificial languageof ethnic scapegoating, does not dispense with the sense of strife central to technical being.If we are an "uninterpreted sign" projected into the future and concealed from the past, thenthe malignancy at the core of technicity might itself, if intensified by thinking, be compelled toreveal its essence. Which is, of course, the value of contemplating Heidegger: a thinker soproximate to the contemporary technical condition that his thought is itself a field of strife,motivated from within by a malice of rage directed against his own expulsion from the polityof conventional political opinion and yet, who in the bitterness of this exile and undoubtedlyagainst his own preference for the rootedness of the "German folk", became a vehicle bywhich the forgotten language of metaphysics -- the homeward-bound language of thepre-Socratics -- speaks again to beings held out into the nothing.

In contemplating Heidegger, we also return to ourselves as "uninterpreted signs." His writingis the future of the past.

Philosophy of Technology

All that is merely technological never arrives at the essence of technology. It cannot evenrecognize its outer precincts. [8]

Make no mistake. Heidegger does not "think" technology within its own terms. Quite thecontrary. Repeatedly he insists that technology cannot be understood technologicallybecause, in opening ourselves up to the question of technology, we are suddenly broughtinto the presence of that which has always been allowed to lie silent because it is theovershadowing default condition of our technical existence. Heidegger is relentless in

making visible that which would prefer to remain in the shadows as the regulatingarchitecture of contemporary existence. For example, Heidegger notes that today, we canonly think technology from the midst of the howling center of the technological vortex, thatwhile we can note that the dominant tendency of technology is towards the "objectification of earth" and the "objectification of (technical) consciousness" [9], we can never be confidentthat in thinking the consequences of technologies of objectification that our thought itself hasnot already been set in place as a necessary "turning" of the technological spiral. And whileHeidegger will note that the key ethical consequence of the relentless objectification of earthand sky and water and flesh is "injurious neglect of the thing," [10] he always makes theparallel claim that thought itself always has about it a form of neglect, that thought, however critical, always conceals and unconceals, that "injurious neglect of the thing" in the mode of order of willing and doing may also have about it the doubled language of human destining.Thinking Heidegger from the virtual present, from the perspective of the "shadow cast aheadby the advent of this turning," [11] that he could only intimate who cannot be fully ambivalenton the ultimate meaning of technology as "injurious neglect of the thing." Who, that is,cannot brush thought against that doubled possibility of injurious neglect, that such injuriousneglect may be, in equal parts, a brutalizing consequence of the dynamic language of (technical) ordering and willing and the deepest seduction of technology? In this case, if theprice to be paid for the unfolding of (our) technological destiny is "injurious neglect of thething" to the point of gutting human subjectivity of its silences, its most essential elements of individual reflection, of thoughtfulness, then is it not now manifest that such injurious neglectof oneself is the deepest fascination and most charismatic promotional feature of virtualcapitalism? The virtual self, therefore, as a wireless game with accelerated technicalconsciousness moving at the speed of injurious neglect.

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Consequently, Heidegger's specific contribution to understanding technology consists of aunique, evocative and comprehensive description of technological experience as a singlehuman process originating in the metaphysics of "enframing," driven forward by theanimating energy of the "will to will," resulting in a culture of "profound boredom," [12] andpossessing art as its possible "turning." Folding together future and past, Heidegger's theoryof technology assumes the form of a general theory of civilization which, beginning with thebasic assumption that technology cannot be understood solely in the language of thetechnological, traces the genealogy of "planetary technicity" to its ancient roots in a way of being that , expanding from its origins in the mythic legacy of the west, comes to representhuman destiny. As human destiny, technology can neither be refused nor simply affirmedbecause of its inextricably ambivalent nature. Left unquestioned, technological experiencereduces life to a "standing-reserve," in the "unconditional service" of the will to technique.

And yet if the "question of technology" cannot be asked without a fundamental inquiry intothe mythic roots of technology as destiny, then it must also be said that the (hyper)reality of technology cannot be denied without a fateful loss of that which is fundamental to humansqua humans. For better and for worse, in boredom as well as in anxiety, the question of technology as destiny means that it is only by intensifying technology, by "thinking"

technique to its roots in ancient mythology and, thereupon, to its future in the expandingempire of "planetary technicity" that we can hope to elucidate the dangers and possibilities of being human in the dawning age of the post-human. Heidegger's "question of technology"is also a way of coming home to the neglected question of the meaning of life in thetechnodrome.

The Politics of the "Standing-Reserve"

Heidegger's famous essay, "The Question Concerning Technology," can only be read now interms of philosophical anthropology. Against its own intentions which were focused onstripping away history from the question of technology and, thereupon, grounding thequestion of technology in the language of its founding metaphysics, this essay has in theforty years since its authorship been reclaimed by the riddle of history. Reclaimed, that is,not in the sense of obsolescence—a theory of technology now superceded by acceleratingdevelopments in the present age of wireless and bio-genetic invention—but reclaimed in thedeeply anthropological sense that Heidegger's analysis of the question of technology is anuncannily accurate diagnosis of the present human situation.

Writing from the perspective of a mid-twentieth century historical period bracketed by the rise

to dominance of mechanical technologies of extraction and the overpowering presence of atomic weapons, Heidegger's view of technology, while focused on mechanical culture, onlyfinds real theoretical and ethical purchase with the advent of electronic and, thereupon,digital culture. In a way that foreshadows contemporary theories of technology, from Virilio'svision of cybernetic technology as a "war machine" operating in the language of the controlof "eyeball culture" and McLuhan's grim vision of the "externalization" of the central nervoussystem in electronic culture to Baudrillard's theorisation of the mass simulation of humandesire, Heidegger does that which is most difficult. Almost as a precession of his own theory,his analysis presences technology, drawing out the animating impulses of techno-culture insuch a way as to compel the "world picture" of technology to fully reveal itself. Refusing tothink technology separately from the question of human destiny, Heidegger's thought alwayshovers around two conflicting impulses in the technological world picture: first, the tendencytowards "enframing" by which the dominating impulse of contemporary technology piratesthe human sensorium on behalf of a globally hegemonic technical apparatus; and, second,

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the tendency toward "poeisis" by which an art of technology, variously expressed inlanguage, poetry, the visual arts, speed writing, an aesthetics of digital dirt, and new mediaart could draw out of the world picture of technology as destining a different future for techne, a future in which technology once again has something to say, to "unconceal," aboutthe relationship between technology and alethia (truth). [13]

Indeed, what is so inspiring about Heidegger's doubled vision of technology is its uniquenessin simultaneously running parallel to the cutting edge of new digital technologies and doingso in such a way as to plunge the "question concerning technology" back into its classicalorigins as a essential expression of being itself. While other theorists have "thought"technology within and against the modernist and now, postmodern, epistemes, Heidegger'sspecial gift to those intent on deciphering the question of technology is a dramatic doublerefusal: refusing, at first, to think technology within strictly contemporary terms by insistingthat the language of technique is derivative from another, more hidden, "presencing" of beingthat hides itself in the shadows of thought; and refusing to think technology as technology,insisting that technology is at its inception never strictly technological but metaphysical.

Consequently, the curiosity: Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" makes of the dynamic drive to planetary technicity a probe for unconcealing a more fundamental"mode of being," a mode of being which, until now, may have purposively retreated into theshadows in the spectral form of "oblivion of being," but which under the artistic "revealing"that is Heidegger's method is finally forced to confess its ancient secrets. In Heidegger'svision of technology, we are always standing midway between the unfolding future of thedrive to technological domination and the revelation of the classical genealogy of thequestion of technology. Both genealogist and futurist—artist and craftsman—Heidegger'sprobe of the "world picture of technology" is always enunciated in the doubled language of that which he seeks to expose—the twin words of provocation and revelation, "challenging-forth" and "poeisis." He is instructive to meditate upon not simply for his dramatic politicaland cultural conclusions concerning the destiny of technology, but, more decisively, for thedeep method of his thought. Always equal to the object of his writing—planetary technicity—,Heidegger not only claimed that technological experience was, above all, a method, but inhis own writing paralleled the world picture of technology as method by making of his ownthought a method of technological revelation. In meditating upon Heidegger, we aresuddenly brought (technically) close to that which is (metaphysically) distant. His mind splitsthe atom of technology. His thought sequences the DNA of the question of technology.

In Heidegger's thought, the twin elements composing the atom of technology in its classicalorigins and which, until now have wandered the "desolation of the earth" separate and at

war, these twin elements of provocation and poeting, calculation and meditation, space andtime, are finally reunited in a new experimental moment of fusion. The Heideggerian methodsolves the riddle that it sought only to reveal and, in doing so, provides an ethics of technology , an ethics that has something fundamental to say about the unfolding future of planetary technicity because the Heideggerian project is technology. Beyond the specifichistorical details populating each of Heidegger's writings on technology, from the atomicweaponry of "The Question Concerning Technology" and the theoretical physics of "What isMetaphysics?" to the bio-genetics of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics , Heidegger brings to the project of thinking technology a mode of expression simultaneously ancient andpost-human, equally at home in the question of being and not-being. And if at the end of hislife, Heidegger abandons the comfortable illusions of existentialism that are the condition of possibility of Being and Time , that is only because faithful to the method of "challenging-forthinto the ordering of the standing-reserve" [14] that is the hallmark of the technologicalsurgery upon the human condition, Heidegger does not, in the end, spare his own thought

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from the bitter lessons of his diagnosis. This is one thinker with the courage to make of hisown theory of technology a model of technicity with such intensity and determination that histhought challenges technology to the death. Challenges, that is, the world picture of technology to circle back on itself, to engage the conflicting impulses towards "harvesting"and "poiesis" in their most primary expression of being in Heidegger's "way of thinking."Without exaggeration, the alethia —the truth—of Heidegger is, at once, the alethia of technology. Resolving the limits and creative intensities of Heidegger's vision of technologyis much more than another perspective external to technology. To think Heidegger is also topresence the interior limits of a mode of (technical) being that seduces by its radicalimpossibility: revelation without actualization, calculation by abandoning justice to theoblivion of being.

The question of Heidegger is proximate to understanding the twenty-first century.

Notes:----------

[1] Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude . In thistext, Heidegger provides the theory of completed nihilism: its fundamental attunement—"profound boredom;" its method—the disciplinary practices of bio-genetics; its dominantcultural sign—terminal drifting towards generalized "indifference."

[2] See in particular, Heidegger's reflections on the historical destiny of the German "folk," inhis Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitat , "Rektoratsrede," Breslau: W.G. Korn,1933.

[3] Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology , "The Word of Nietzsche,"p.102. "In the willing of this will, however, there comes upon man the condition that heconcomitantly will the conditions, the requirements, of such a willing. That means: to positvalues and to ascribe worth to everything in keeping with values. In such a manner doesvalue determine all that is in its Being."

[4] Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche , "The Will to Power." p.197. Beyond the question of technology, Heidegger argues that the will to will that is the essence of technologicaldestining always requires that human and non-human nature be reduced to the function of "standing-reserve." Thus, for example, in Nietzsche, Heidegger describes the essentialmovement of the will to power as gathering into itself means for the "preservation" of power."Therefore, enhancement of power is at the same time in itself the preservation of power." Inis in this sense that Heidegger describes the technical condition of human subjectivity as"standing-reserve" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays , p. 23. In hisessay, "On the Question of Being," Heidegger notes: "The reduction that can be ascertainedwithin beings rests on the production of being, namely, on the unfolding of the will to power into the unconditional will to will," Pathmarks , p. 312.

[5] Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings , "The Origin of the Work of Art," pp. 140-212. For Heidegger, the importance of art in the technological milieu was precisely to open thequestion of technology to a different form of interpretation, not only the logic of "calculability"

but also the revelation of poetry.[6] Martin Heidegger, Pathways , p.258. "Homelessness so understood consists in theabandonment of beings by being. Homelessness is the symptom of the oblivion of being.

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Because of it the truth of being remains unthought."

[7] Ibid; "What is Metaphysics," p.93. "Being held out into the nothing—as Dasein is—on theground of concealed anxiety makes the human being a lieutenant of the nothing."

[8] Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays , p.44.

[9] Ibid., p.100. In "The Word of Nietzsche," Heidegger draws the conclusion fromtechnological objectification as destiny: "Man, within the subjectness belonging to whatever is, rises up into the subjectivity of his essence. Man enters into insurrection. The worldchanges into object. In this revolutionary objectifying of everything that is, the earth, thatwhich first of all must be put at the disposal of representing and setting forth, moves into themidst of human positing and analyzing. The earth can show itself only as an object of assault, an assault that, in human willing, establishes itself as unconditional objectification."

[10] Ibid., p.48.

[11] Martin Heidegger, "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays , p.41.

[12] Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics , p.162. "Profoundboredom, its being left empty, means being delivered over to beings' telling refusal of themselves as a whole. It is thus emptiness as a whole." Intensifying Nietzsche's admonitionthat man has grown tired of himself, Heidegger asks: "Has man in the end become boring tohimself?—as the question in which we ready ourselves for a fundamental attunement of our Dasein." (FCM, p. 161.)

[13] Writing of the "grounding-attunement," Heidegger states: "In the first beginning: deepwonder. In another beginning: deep foreboding." Martin Heidegger, Contributions toPhilosophy (From Enowning) , translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomingtonand Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. (p.15).

[14] Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," p.20.

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