Poli Rev Cases Finals (4.23.2016)

8/17/2019 Poli Rev Cases Finals (4.23.2016)

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EN BANC

G.R. No. L-65366 November 9, 1983

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behal o !he "N#$-B"SES %O"L$#$ON &"B%', petitioner,

vs.R"(ON B"G"#S$NG, a) (a*or o !he %i!* o (anila, respondent.

Lorenzo M. Tañada Jose W. Diokno and Haydee B. Yorac for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

+ERN"NO, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This Court, in this case of first impression, at least as to some aspects, is called upon to

delineate the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate rights to free speech and

peaceable assembly, 1 against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor Ramon Bagatsing.Petitioner, retired Justice JB L. Reyes, on behalf of the nti!Bases Coalition sought a permit from the City

of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on "ctober #$, %&'( from #)** to +)** in the afternoon,

starting from the Luneta, a public par, to the gates of the -nited tates /mbassy, hardly t0o blocs

a0ay. "nce there, and in an open space of public property, a short program 0ould be held. 1uring the

course of the oral argument, 3 it 0as stated that after the delivery of t0o brief speeches, a petition based

on the resolution adopted on the last day by the 2nternational Conference for 3eneral 1isbarmament,

4orld Peace and the Removal of ll 5oreign Military Bases held in Manila, 0ould be presented to a

representative of the /mbassy or any of its personnel 0ho may be there so that it may be delivered to the

-nited tates mbassador. The march 0ould be attended by the local and foreign participants of suchconference. There 0as lie0ise an assurance in the petition that in the e6ercise of the constitutional rights

to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps 0ould be taen by it 7to ensure a peaceful march

and rally.7

The filing of this suit for mandamus 0ith alternative prayer for 0rit of preliminary mandatory in8unction on

"ctober #*, %&'( 0as due to the fact that as of that date, petitioner had not been informed of any action

taen on his re9uest on behalf of the organi:ation to hold a rally. "n "ctober #+, %&'(, the ans0er of

respondent Mayor 0as filed on his behalf by ssistant olicitor 3eneral /duardo 3. Montenegro. 5 2t

turned out that on "ctober %&, such permit 0as denied. Petitioner 0as una0are of such a fact as the

denial 0as sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit 0as due to police intelligence reports

0hich strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit at this time and at the place applied

for.7 6 To be more specific, reference 0as made to persistent intelligence reports affirm;ing< the plans of

subversive=criminal elements to infiltrate and=or disrupt any assembly or congregations 0here a large

number of people is e6pected to attend.7 / Respondent Mayor suggested, ho0ever, in accordance 0ith

the recommendation of the police authorities, that 7a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at

the Ri:al Coliseum or any other enclosed area 0here the safety of the participants themselves and the

general public may be ensured.7 8

The oral argument 0as heard on "ctober #+, %&'(, the very same day the ans0er 0as filed. The Court

then deliberated on the matter. That same afternoon, a minute resolution 0as issued by the Court


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granting the mandatory in8unction prayed for on the ground that there 0as no sho0ing of the e6istence of

a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could 8ustify the denial of a permit. "n this point, the

Court 0as unanimous, but there 0as a dissent by Justice 9uino on the ground that the holding of a rally

in front of the - /mbassy 0ould be violative of "rdinance >o. ?#&+ of the City of Manila. The last

sentence of such minute resolution reads) 7This resolution is 0ithout pre8udice to a more e6tended

opinion.7 9 @ence this detailed e6position of the CourtAs stand on the matter.

%. 2t is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the e6ercise of the cognate rights to free speech

and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit. The Constitution is 9uite e6plicit) 7>o la0 shall

be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the 3overnment for redress of grievances.7 10 5ree speech, lie free press, may be

2dentified 0ith the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern 0ithout censorship

or punishment. 11 There is to be then no previous restraint on the communication of vie0s or subse9uent

liability 0hether in libel suits, 1 prosecution for sedition, 13 or action for damages, 1 or contempt

proceedings 15 unless there be a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that ;the tate< has a right

to prevent.7 16 5reedom of assembly connotes the right people to meet peaceably for consultation and

discussion of matters "f public concern. 1/ 2t is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect.

2t is hot to be limited, much less denied, e6cept on a sho0ing, as As the case 0ith freedom of e6pression,

of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.18

/ven prior to the%&(+ Constitution, Justice Maicolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary conse9uence of our

republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. 19 To paraphrase opinion of Justice

Rutledge speaing for the ma8ority of the !erican S"pre!e #o"rt Tho!as $. #ollins, 0 it 0as not by

accident or coincidence that the right to freedom of speech and of the press 0ere toupled in a single

guarantee 0ith the and to petition the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the

government for redress of grievances. ll these rights, 0hile not 2dentical, are inseparable. the every

case, therefo re there is a limitation placed on the e6ercise of this right, the 8udiciary is called upon to

e6amine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole 8ustification for a limitation on the

e6ercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a

character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any

other legitimate public interest. 1

#. >o0here is the rationale that underlies the freedom of e6pression and peaceable assembly better

e6pressed than in this e6cerpt from an opinion of Justice 5ranfurter) 72t must never be forgotten,

ho0ever, that the Bill of Rights 0as the child of the /nlightenment. Bac of the guaranty of free speech

lay faith in the po0er of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. 2t

0as in order to avert force and e6plosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that

the guaranty of free speech 0as given a generous scope. But utterance in a conte6t of violence can lose

its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force. uch utterance 0as not

meant to be sheltered by the Constitution.7 4hat 0as rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason,

the utterance, 0hether verbal or printed, being in a conte6t of violence. 2t must al0ays be remembered

that this right lie0ise provides for a safety valve, allo0ing parties the opportunity to give vent to their!

vie0s, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. 5or if the peaceful means of communication

cannot be availed of, resort to non!peaceful means may be the only alternative. >or is this the sole

reason for the e6pression of dissent. 2t means more than 8ust the right to be heard of the person 0ho feelsaggrieved or 0ho is dissatisfied 0ith things as they are. 2ts value may lie in the fact that there may be

something 0orth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of 2deas. There are, of

course, 0ell!defined limits. 4hat is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. "ne may not advocate disorder in

the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloa of dissent. The Constitution fro0ns on

disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly. resort to force is ruled out and outbreas of violence to be

avoided. The utmost calm though is not re9uired. s pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in

%&*? to be precise, %nited States $. p"rado) 3 72t is rather to be e6pected that more or less disorder 0ill

mar the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances 0hether real or imaginary, because


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on such occasions feeling is al0ays 0rought to a high pitch of e6citement, and the greater the grievance

and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, 0ill be the disciplinary control of the leaders

over their irresponsible follo0ers.7 2t bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoed,

riotous conduct, in8ury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided, To give free rein to oneAs

destructive urges is to call for condemnation. 2t is to mae a mocery of the high estate occupied by

intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.

(. There can be no legal ob8ection, absent the e6istence of a clear and present danger of a substantive

evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place 0here the peace rally 0ould start. The Philippines is committed

to the vie0 e6pressed in the plurality opinion, of %&(& vintage, of Justice Roberts in Ha&"e $. #'() 5

4henever the title of streets and pars may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of

the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts

bet0een citi:ens, and discussing public 9uestions. uch use of the streets and public places has, from

ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citi:ens. The privilege of a

citi:en of the -nited tates to use the streets and pars for communication of vie0s on national 9uestions

may be regulated in the interest of all it is not absolute, but relative, and must be e6ercised in

subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance 0ith peace and good order

but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied. 6 The above e6cerpt 0as 9uoted 0ith

approval in Primicias v. 5ugoso./

Primicias made e6plicit 0hat 0as implicit in M"nicipality of #a$ite $.*o+as,7 8 a %&%+ decision, 0here this Court categorically affirmed that pla:as or pars and streets are

outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Pla:a oledad of plaintiff!

municipality. Reference 0as made to such pla:a 7being a promenade for public use,7 9 0hich certainly is

not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no valid reason 0hy a permit should not

be granted for the or oposed march and rally starting from a public dar that is the Luneta.

. >either can there be any valid ob8ection to the use of the streets, to the gates of the - /mbassy,

hardly t0o bloc!a0ay at the Ro6as Boulevard. ,ri!icias $. -"&oso has resolved any luring doubt on the

matter. 2n holding that the then Mayor 5ugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public

meeting at Pla:a Miranda in Duiapo, this Court categorically declared) 7"ur conclusion finds support in

the decision in the case of Willis #o $s. State of /e0 Ha!pshire, (%# -.., +$&. 2n that case, the statute

of >e0 @ampshire P. L. chap. %+, section #, providing that Ano parade or procession upon any groundabutting thereon, shall A1e permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be e6plained from the

selectmen of the to0n or from licensing committee,A 0as construed by the upreme Court of >e0

@ampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license,

and held valid. nd the upreme Court of the -nited tates, in its decision E%&%F penned by Chief

Justice @ughes affirming the 8udgment of the tate upreme Court, held that Aa statute re9uiring persons

using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local

authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and

press, 0here, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in

the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession,

0ith a vie0 to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper

policing, and are not invested 0ith arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... 7 30 >or should the

point made by Chief Justice @ughes in a subse9uent portion of the opinion be ignored, 7Civil liberties, as

guaranteed by the Constitution, imply the e6istence of an organi:ed society maintaining public order0ithout 0hich liberty itself 0ould be lost in the e6cesses of unrestricted abuses. The authority of a

municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use

of public high0ays has never been regarded as inconsistent 0ith civil liberties but rather as one of the

means of safeguarding the good order upon 0hich they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the

streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. 4here a restriction of the

use of high0ays in that relation is designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all, it

cannot be disregarded by the attempted e6ercise of some civil right 0hich in other circumstances 0ould

be entitled to protection.7 31


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+. There is a novel aspect to this case, 2f the rally 0ere confined to Luneta, no 9uestion, as noted, 0ould

have arisen. o, too, if the march 0ould end at another par. s previously mentioned though, there

0ould be a short program upon reaching the public space bet0een the t0o gates of the -nited tates

/mbassy at Ro6as Boulevard. That 0ould be follo0ed by the handing over of a petition based on the

resolution adopted at the closing session of the nti!Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a signatory of the

Gienna Convention on 1iplomatic Relations adopted in %&$%. 2t 0as concurred in by the then Philippine

enate on May (, %&$+ and the instrument of ratification 0as signed by the President on "ctober %%,%&$+, and 0as thereafter deposited 0ith the ecretary 3eneral of the -nited >ations on >ovember %+. s

of that date then, it 0as binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of the rticle ## reads) 7#. The

receiving tate is under a special duty to tae appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission

against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or

impairment of its dignity. 7 3 The Constitution 7adopts the generally accepted principles of international

la0 as part of the la0 of the land. ...7 33 To the e6tent that the Gienna Convention is a restatement of the

generally accepted principles of international la0, it should be a part of the la0 of the land. 3 That being

the case, if there 0ere a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the

peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there 0ould be a 8ustification for the denial of the permit

insofar as the terminal point 0ould be the /mbassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on "rdinance >o.

?#&+ of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations 0ithin a radius of

five hundred E+**F feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. -nless theordinance is nullified, or declared "ltra $ires1 its invocation as a defense is understandable but not

decisive, in vie0 of the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable

assembly. /ven if sho0n then to be applicable, that 9uestion the confronts this Court.

$. There is merit to the observation that e6cept as to the novel aspects of a litigation, the 8udgment must

be confined 0ithin the limits of previous decisions. The la0 declared on past occasions is, on the 0hole, a

safe guide, o it has been here. @ence, as noted, on the afternoon of the hearing, "ctober #+, %&'(, this

Court issued the minute resolution granting the mandatory in8unction allo0ing the proposed march and

rally scheduled for the ne6t day. That conclusion 0as inevitable ill the absence of a clear and present

danger of a substantive, evil to a legitimate public interest. There 0as no 8ustification then to deny the

e6ercise of the constitutional rights of tree speech and peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by

our Constitution and the -niversal 1eclaration of @uman Rights. 35 The participants to such assembly,

composed primarily of those in attendance at the 2nternational Conference for 3eneral 1isbarmament,

4orld Peace and the Removal of ll 5oreign Military Bases 0ould start from the Luneta. proceeding

through Ro6as Boulevard to the gates of the -nited tates /mbassy located at the same street. To

repeat, it is settled la0 that as to public places, especially so as to pars and streets, there is freedom of

access. >or is their use dependent on 0ho is the applicant for the permit, 0hether an individual or a

group. 2f it 0ere, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an e9ual

protection 9uestion. The principle under merican doctrines 0as given utterance by Chief Justice @ughes

in these 0ords) 7The 9uestion, if the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is

not as to the auspices under 0hich the meeting is held but as to its purpose not as to The relations of the

speaers, but 0hether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech 0hich the

Constitution protects.7 36 There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering 0ere

mared by turbulence. That 0ould deprive it of its peaceful character. /ven then, only the guilty parties

should be held accountable. 2t is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid ofdiscretion in determining 0hether or not a permit 0ould be granted. 2t is not, ho0ever, unfettered

discretion. 4hile prudence re9uires that there be a realistic appraisal not of 0hat may possibly occur but

of 0hat may pro2a2ly occ"r , given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption H especially so

0here the assembly is scheduled for a specific public H place is that the permit must be for the assembly

being held there. The e6ercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaing for the

merican upreme Court, is not to be 7abridged on the plea that it may be e6ercised in some other

place.7 3/


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?. 2n fairness to respondent Mayor, he acted on the belief that /a$arro $. 3ille&as 38 and ,a&kakaisa n&

Man&&a&a0an& ,ilipino 4,M,.5 $. Ba&atsin&1 39 called for application. 4hile the 3eneral rule is that a

permit should recogni:e the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice,

another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be sho0n that there is a clear and present

danger of a substantive evil if no such change 0ere made. 2n the >avarro and the Pagaaisa decisions,

this Court 0as persuaded that the clear and present danger test 0as satisfied. The present situation is

9uite different. @ence the decision reached by the Court. The mere assertion that subversives mayinfiltrate the rans of the demonstrators does not suffice. >ot that it should be overlooed. There 0as in

this case, ho0ever, the assurance of 3eneral >arciso Cabrera, uperintendent, 4estern Police 1istrict,

Metropolitan Police 5orce, that the police force is in a position to cope 0ith such emergency should it

arise That is to comply 0ith its duty to e6tend protection to the participants of such peaceable assembly.

lso from him came the commendable admission that there 0ere the least five previous demonstrations

at the Bayvie0 hotel rea and Pla:a 5erguson in front of the -nited tates /mbassy 0here no unto0ard

event occurred. 2t 0as made clear by petitioner, through counsel, that no act offensive to the dignity of the

-nited tates Mission in the Philippines 0ould tae place and that, as mentioned at the outset of this

opinion, 7all the necessary steps 0ould be taen by it Ato ensure a peaceful march and rally.A 7 0 ssistant

olicitor 3eneral Montenegro e6pressed the vie0 that the presence of policemen may in itself be a

provocation. 2t is a sufficient ans0er that they should stay at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert

to cope 0ith any contingency. There is no need to repeat 0hat 0as pointed out by Chief Justice @ughes inCo6 that precisely, it is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those

e6ercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of e6pression.

'. By 0ay of a summary The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing

authority of the date, the public place 0here and the time 0hen it 0ill tae place. 2f it 0ere a private place,

only the consent of the o0ner or the one entitled to its legal possession is re9uired. uch application

should be filed 0ell ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise 0hether there may

be valid ob8ections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. 2t is an

indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the

standard for the decision reached. 2f he is of the vie0 that there is such an imminent and grave danger of

a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, 0hether favorable

or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, then, can have

recourse to the proper 8udicial authority. 5ree speech and peaceable assembly, along 0ith the other

intellectual freedoms, are highly raned in our scheme of constitutional values. 2t cannot be too strongly

stressed that on the 8udiciary, H even more so than on the other departments H rests the grave and

delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such preferred rights. >o verbal formula,

no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense 0ith 0hat has been so felicitiously termed by Justice

@olmes 7as the sovereign prerogative of 8udgment.7 >onetheless, the presumption must be to incline the

0eight of the scales of 8ustice on the side of such rights, en8oying as they do precedence and primacy.

Clearly then, to the e6tent that there may be inconsistencies bet0een this resolution and that of /a$arro

$. 3ille&as, that case is pro tanto modified. o it 0as made clear in the original resolution of "ctober #+,

%&'(.

&. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of "rdinance >o. ?#&+ of the City of Manila

prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations 0ithin a radius of five hundred E+**F feetfrom any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes. 2t is to be admitted that it finds support 2n

the previously 9uoted rticle ## of the Gienna Convention on 1iplomatic Relations. There 0as no

sho0ing, ho0ever, that the distance bet0een the chancery and the embassy gate is less than +** feet.

/ven if it could be sho0n that such a condition is satisfied. it does not follo0 that respondent Mayor could

legally act the 0ay he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. 2t could

be argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the e6ercise of the right of

peaceable assembly presents itself. s in this case there 0as no proof that the distance is less than +**

feet, the need to pass on that issue 0as obviated, hould it come, then the 9ualification and observation


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of Justices Maasiar and Plana certainly cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded

the rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

%*. "rdinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the denial or the modification of the

permit sought and order the respondent official, to grant it. >onetheless, as there 0as urgency in this

case, the proposed march and rally being scheduled for the ne6t day after the hearing, this Court. in the

e6ercise of its conceded authority, granted the mandatory in8unction in the resolution of "ctober #+, %&'(.2t may be noted that the peaceful character of the peace march and rally on "ctober #$ 0as not marred

by any unto0ard incident. o it has been in other assemblies held else0here. 2t is 9uite reassuring such

that both on the part of the national government and the citi:ens, reason and moderation have prevailed.

That is as it should be.

4@/R/5"R/, the mandatory in8unction prayed for is granted. >o costs.

#oncepcion1 Jr.1 G"errero1 Melencio6Herrera1 7scolin1 *elo$a and G"tierrez1 1 Jr.1JJ.1 conc"r.

De #astro1 J1 is on lea$e.

Seara!e Oinion)

#EE2"NEE, J., concurring)

The Chief JusticeAs opinion of the Court reaffirms the doctrine of ,ri!icias $s. -"&oso 1 that 8the ri&ht to freedo! of speech and to peacef"lly asse!2le and petition the &o$ern!ent for redress

of &rie$ances are f"nda!ental personal ri&hts of the people reco&nized and &"aranteed 2y the

constit"tions of de!ocratic co"ntries8 and that the city or to0n mayors are not conferred 7the po0er to

refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets

or public places 0here the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.7 The most recent

graphic demonstration of 0hat this great right of peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances

could accomplish 0as the civil rights march on 4ashington t0enty years ago under the late assassinated

blac leader Martin Luther Iing, Jr. E0hose birthday has no0 been declared an merican national holidayF

0hich subpoenaed the conscience of the nation,7 and a0aened the conscience of millions of previously

indifferent mericans and eventually Eafter many disorders and riots yet to comeF 0as to put an end to

segregation and discrimination against the merican >egro.

The proced"re for the securing of such permits for peaceable assembly is succintly set forth in the

summary given by the Court Justice in paragraph ' of the CourtAs opinion, 0ith the in8unction that 7the

presumption must be to incline the 0eight of the scales of 8ustice on the side of such rights, en8oying as

they do, precedence and primacy,7 The e6ception of the clear and present danger rule, 0hich alone 0ould

0arrant a limitation of these fundamental rights, is therein restated in paragraph %, thus) 7The sole

8ustification for a limitation on the e6ercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic


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institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public

morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. 7

2t bears emphasis that the burden to sho0 the e6istence of grave and imminent danger that 0ould 8ustify

adverse action on the application lies on the mayor as licensing authority. There must 2e o2+ecti$e and

con$incin&1 not s"2+ecti$e or con+ect"ral proof of the eistence of s"ch clear and present dan&er . s

stated in our Resolution of "ctober #+, %&'(, 0hich granted the mandatory in8unction as prayed for, 72t isessential for the validity of a denial of a permit 0hich amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that

the licensin& a"thority does not rely solely on his o0n appraisal of 0hat p"2lic 0elfare1 peace or safety

!ay re9"ire. To +"stify s"ch a li!itation there !"st 2e proof of s"ch 0ei&ht and s"fficiency to satisfy the

clear and present dan&er test. The possi2ility that s"2$ersi$es !ay infiltrate the ranks of the

de!onstrators is not eno"&h.8 s stated by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney $s.

#alifornia. t:ñ.;


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4e thin the court belo0 0as right in holding the ordinance 9uoted in >ote 2 void upon its

face. 2t does not mae comfort or convenience in the use of streets or pars the standard

of official action. 2t enables the 1irector of afety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion

that such refusal 0ill prevent Ariots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. 2t can thus, as

the record discloses, be made the instr"!ent of ar2itrary s"ppression of free epression

of $ie0s on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaing 0ill undoubtedly ApreventA

such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made asubstitute for the duty to maintain order in connection 0ith the e6ercise of the right.

E/mphasis suppliedF

>eedless to say, the leaders of the peaceable assembly should tae all the necessary measures to

ensure a peaceful march and assembly and to avoid the possibility of infiltrators and troublemaers

disrupting the same, concommitantly 0ith the duty of the police to e6tend protection to the participants

7staying at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their duty.7 But should any disorderly

conduct or incidents occur, 0hether provoed or other0ise, it is 0ell to recall former Chief Justice Ricardo

ParasA in8unction in his concurring opinion in -"&oso, citing the %&*? case of %.S. $s. p"rado, that such

instances of 7disorderly conduct by individual members of a cro0d Ebe not sei:edF as an e6cuse to

characteri:e the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities7 and render illusory

the right of peaceable assembly, thus) t:ñ.;then the ri&ht to asse!2le and to petition for redress of

&rie$ances 0o"ld 2eco!e a del"sion and snare and the atte!pt to eercise it on the

!ost ri&hteo"s occasion and in the !ost peacea2le !anner 0o"ld epose all those 0ho

took part therein to the se$erest and !ost "n!erited p"nish!ent1 if the p"rposes 0hichthey so"&ht to attain did not happen to 2e pleasin& to the prosec"tin& a"thorities. 'f

instances of disorderly cond"ct occ"r on s"ch occasions, the guilty individuals should be

sought out and punished therefor. E/mphasis suppliedF.

s it turned out, the demonstration 0as held on "ctober #$, %&'( peaceably and 0ithout any unto0ard

event or evil result, as pledged by the organi:ers Elie at least five previous peaceful demonstrations in

the areaF. @o0ever, even if there had been any incidents of disorder, this 0ould in no 0ay sho0 the

CourtAs mandatory in8unction to have been 0rongfully issued. The salutary desire on the part of

respondent to prevent disorder cannot be pursued by the un8ustified denial and suppression of the

peopleAs basic rights, 0hich 0ould thereby turn out to be mere paper rights.

(""S$"R, J., concurring)

4ith the 8ustification that in case of conflict, the Philippine Constitution H particularly the Bill of Rights H

should prevail over the Gienna Convention.


9/34

"B" S"N#OS, J., concurring)

To add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief Justice is lie bringing coal to >e0castle, 2 8ust 0ant to

state for the record that 2 voted for the issuance e6!parte of a preliminary mandatory in8unction.

4L"N", J., concurring)

"n the 0hole, 2 concur in the learned vie0s of the distinguished Chief Justice. 2 0ould lie ho0ever to

voice a reservation regarding "rdinance >o. ?#&+ of the City of Manila 0hich has been invoed by the

respondent.

The main opinion yields the implication that a rally or demonstration made 0ithin +** feet from the

chancery of a foreign embassy 0ould be banned for coming 0ithin the terms of the prohibition of the cited

"rdinance 0hich 0as adopted, so it is said, precisely to implement a treaty obligation of the Philippines

under the %&$% Gienna Convention on 1iplomatic Relations.

2n my vie0, 0ithout saying that the "rdinance is obno6ious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly

invoed 0henever its application 0ould collide 0ith a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of

assembly and=or e6pression, as in the case at bar, regardless of 0hether the chancery of any foreign

embassy is beyond or 0ithin +** feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.

"$NO, J., dissenting)

Goted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front of the - /mbassy violates

"rdinance >o. ?#&+ of the City of Manila.

Seara!e Oinion)

#EE2"NEE, J., concurring)

The Chief JusticeAs opinion of the Court reaffirms the doctrine of ,ri!icias $s. -"&oso 1 that 8the ri&ht to

freedo! of speech and to peacef"lly asse!2le and petition the &o$ern!ent for redress of &rie$ances are

f"nda!ental personal ri&hts of the people reco&nized and &"aranteed 2y the constit"tions of de!ocratic

co"ntries8 and that the city or to0n mayors are not conferred 7the po0er to refuse to grant the permit, butonly the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places 0here the

parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.7 The most recent graphic demonstration of

0hat this great right of peaceful assembly and petition for redress of grievances could accomplish 0as the

civil rights march on 4ashington t0enty years ago under the late assassinated blac leader Martin Luther

Iing, Jr. E0hose birthday has no0 been declared an merican national holidayF 0hich subpoenaed the

conscience of the nation,7 and a0aened the conscience of millions of previously indifferent mericans

and eventually Eafter many disorders and riots yet to comeF 0as to put an end to segregation and

discrimination against the merican >egro.


10/34

The proced"re for the securing of such permits for peaceable assembly is succintly set forth in the

summary given by the Court Justice in paragraph ' of the CourtAs opinion, 0ith the in8unction that 7the

presumption must be to incline the 0eight of the scales of 8ustice on the side of such rights, en8oying as

they do, precedence and primacy,7 The e6ception of the clear and present danger rule, 0hich alone 0ould

0arrant a limitation of these fundamental rights, is therein restated in paragraph %, thus) 7The sole

8ustification for a limitation on the e6ercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic

institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, publicmorals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest. 7

2t bears emphasis that the burden to sho0 the e6istence of grave and imminent danger that 0ould 8ustify

adverse action on the application lies on the mayor as licensing authority. There must 2e o2+ecti$e and

con$incin&1 not s"2+ecti$e or con+ect"ral proof of the eistence of s"ch clear and present dan&er . s

stated in our Resolution of "ctober #+, %&'(, 0hich granted the mandatory in8unction as prayed for, 72t is

essential for the validity of a denial of a permit 0hich amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that

the licensin& a"thority does not rely solely on his o0n appraisal of 0hat p"2lic 0elfare1 peace or safety

!ay re9"ire. To +"stify s"ch a li!itation there !"st 2e proof of s"ch 0ei&ht and s"fficiency to satisfy the

clear and present dan&er test. The possi2ility that s"2$ersi$es !ay infiltrate the ranks of the

de!onstrators is not eno"&h.8 s stated by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney $s.

#alifornia.

t:ñ.;


11/34

the streets and pars for communication of vie0s on national 9uestions may be regulated

in the interest of all it is not absolute, but relative, and must be e6ercised in subordination

to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance 0ith peace and good order

but it !"st not1 in the &"ise of re&"lation1 2e a2rid&ed or denied .

4e thin the court belo0 0as right in holding the ordinance 9uoted in >ote 2 void upon its

face. 2t does not mae comfort or convenience in the use of streets or pars the standardof official action. 2t enables the 1irector of afety to refuse a permit on his mere opinion

that such refusal 0ill prevent Ariots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. 2t can thus, as

the record discloses, be made the instr"!ent of ar2itrary s"ppression of free epression

of $ie0s on national affairs for the prohibition of all speaing 0ill undoubtedly ApreventA

such eventualities. But uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege cannot be made a

substitute for the duty to maintain order in connection 0ith the e6ercise of the right.

E/mphasis suppliedF

>eedless to say, the leaders of the peaceable assembly should tae all the necessary measures to

ensure a peaceful march and assembly and to avoid the possibility of infiltrators and troublemaers

disrupting the same, concommitantly 0ith the duty of the police to e6tend protection to the participants

7staying at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their duty.7 But should any disorderlyconduct or incidents occur, 0hether provoed or other0ise, it is 0ell to recall former Chief Justice Ricardo

ParasA in8unction in his concurring opinion in -"&oso, citing the %&*? case of %.S. $s. p"rado, that such

instances of 7disorderly conduct by individual members of a cro0d Ebe not sei:edF as an e6cuse to

characteri:e the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities7 and render illusory

the right of peaceable assembly, thus) t:ñ.;then the ri&ht to asse!2le and to petition for redress of

&rie$ances 0o"ld 2eco!e a del"sion and snare and the atte!pt to eercise it on the

!ost ri&hteo"s occasion and in the !ost peacea2le !anner 0o"ld epose all those 0ho

took part therein to the se$erest and !ost "n!erited p"nish!ent1 if the p"rposes 0hich

they so"&ht to attain did not happen to 2e pleasin& to the prosec"tin& a"thorities. 'f

instances of disorderly cond"ct occ"r on s"ch occasions, the guilty individuals should be

sought out and punished therefor. E/mphasis suppliedF.

s it turned out, the demonstration 0as held on "ctober #$, %&'( peaceably and 0ithout any unto0ard

event or evil result, as pledged by the organi:ers Elie at least five previous peaceful demonstrations in

the areaF. @o0ever, even if there had been any incidents of disorder, this 0ould in no 0ay sho0 the

CourtAs mandatory in8unction to have been 0rongfully issued. The salutary desire on the part of

respondent to prevent disorder cannot be pursued by the un8ustified denial and suppression of the

peopleAs basic rights, 0hich 0ould thereby turn out to be mere paper rights.

(""S$"R, J., concurring)


12/34

4ith the 8ustification that in case of conflict, the Philippine Constitution H particularly the Bill of Rights H

should prevail over the Gienna Convention.

"B" S"N#OS, J., concurring)

To add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief Justice is lie bringing coal to >e0castle, 2 8ust 0ant to

state for the record that 2 voted for the issuance e6!parte of a preliminary mandatory in8unction.

4L"N", J., concurring)

"n the 0hole, 2 concur in the learned vie0s of the distinguished Chief Justice. 2 0ould lie ho0ever to

voice a reservation regarding "rdinance >o. ?#&+ of the City of Manila 0hich has been invoed by the

respondent.

The main opinion yields the implication that a rally or demonstration made 0ithin +** feet from the

chancery of a foreign embassy 0ould be banned for coming 0ithin the terms of the prohibition of the cited

"rdinance 0hich 0as adopted, so it is said, precisely to implement a treaty obligation of the Philippines

under the %&$% Gienna Convention on 1iplomatic Relations.

2n my vie0, 0ithout saying that the "rdinance is obno6ious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly

invoed 0henever its application 0ould collide 0ith a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of

assembly and=or e6pression, as in the case at bar, regardless of 0hether the chancery of any foreign

embassy is beyond or 0ithin +** feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.

"$NO, J., dissenting)

Goted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front of the - /mbassy violates

"rdinance >o. ?#&+ of the City of Manila.

Reyes v Bagatsing 125 SCRA 553 (1983)

Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on October

2! "#$% from 2:&& to ':&& in the afternoon! starting from the (uneta to the gates of the )nited *tates

Embassy+ Once there! and in an open space of public property! a short program ,ould be held+ -he march

,ould be attended by the local and foreign participants of such conference+ -hat ,ould be follo,ed by

the handing o.er of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti/BasesCoalition+ -here ,as li0e,ise an assurance in the petition that in the e1ercise of the constitutional rights

to free speech and assembly! all the necessary steps ,ould be ta0en by it to ensure a peaceful march and

rally+ 3o,e.er the re4uest ,as denied+ 5eference ,as made to persistent intelligence reports affirming

the plans of sub.ersi.e6criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any assembly or congregations ,here alarge number of people is e1pected to attend+ 5espondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to

be held at the 5i7al Coliseum or any other enclosed area ,here the safety of the participants themsel.es

and the general public may be ensured+ An oral argument ,as heard and the mandatory in8unction ,as

granted on the ground that there ,as no sho,ing of the e1istence of a clear and present danger of a


13/34

substanti.e e.il that could 8ustify the denial of a permit+ 3o,e.er 9ustice A4uino dissented that the rally

is .iolati.e of Ordinance No+ 2#' of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies ,ithin a radius

of fi.e hundred ;'&&< feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes+ 3ence the Court

resol.es+

=ssue: >hether or Not the freedom of e1pression and the right to peaceably assemble .iolated+

3eld: ?es+ -he in.ocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries ,ith it the implication

that the right to free speech has li0e,ise been disregarded+ =t is settled la, that as to public places!

especially so as to par0s and streets! there is freedom of access+ Nor is their use dependent on ,ho is the

applicant for the permit! ,hether an indi.idual or a group+ -here can be no legal ob8ection! absent the

e1istence of a clear and present danger of a substanti.e e.il! on the choice of (uneta as the place ,here

the peace rally ,ould start+ -ime immemorial (uneta has been used for purposes of assembly!

communicating thoughts bet,een citi7ens! and discussing public 4uestions+

*uch use of the public places has from ancient times! been a part of the pri.ileges! immunities! rights! and

liberties of citi7ens+

>ith regard to the ordinance! there ,as no sho,ing that there ,as .iolation and e.en if it could be sho,nthat such a condition is satisfied it does not follo, that respondent could legally act the ,ay he did+ -he

.alidity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged+

A summary of the application for permit for rally: -he applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should

inform the licensing authority of the date! the public place ,here and the time ,hen it ,ill ta0e place+ =f it

,ere a pri.ate place! only the consent of the o,ner or the one entitled to its legal possession is re4uired+

*uch application should be filed ,ell ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to appraise,hether there may be .alid ob8ections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place+

=t is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the

standard for the decision reached+ Notice is gi.en to applicants for the denial+

125 SCRA 553 November 9 1983 [Bill of Rights, Freedom of Free Speeh, !e"e"ble

Assembl#$

FACTS:

retired %&stie Re#es i' beh"lf of the A'ti(B"ses Co"litio', so&ght to permit " r"ll#

permit from )&'et" !"r* to fro't g"te of the +S mb"ss# i' -"'il". -"#or B"g"tsi'g

de'ied the petitio'. /e iss&ed Cit# 0rdi'"'e No. 295 to prohibit r"ll#i'g 5

meter r"di&s "ro&'d the mb"ss#.

ISSUE:

hether or 'ot the -"#or viol"ted the petitio'ers4 o'stit&tio'"l right.

RULING:

es, the m"#or4s ordi'"'e 6hih prohibit the petitio'ers to r"ll# viol"tes their

o'stit&tio'"l right to free speeh "'d pe"e"ble "ssembl#. 7t is settled l"6 th"t "s

to p&bli pl"es, espei"ll# so "s to p"r*s "'d streets, there is freedom of "ess.

Nor is their &se depe'de't o' 6ho is the "ppli"'t for the permit, 6hether "'

i'divid&"l or " gro&p.


14/34

EN BANC

G.R. No. 1/685 J7l* 3, 1998

BL"S +. O4LE, petitioner,

vs.

RBEN . #ORRES, "LE"NER "G$RRE, 2E%#OR $LL"NE", %$EL$#O 2"B$#O, ROBER# B"RBERS, %"R(EN%$#"

REO$%", %ES"R S"R$NO, REN"#O "LEN%$", #O("S 4. "+R$%", 2E" O+ #2E N"#$ON"L %O(4#ER %EN#ER an:

%2"$R("N O+ #2E %O(($SS$ON ON "$#, respondents.

4NO, J.:

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of enator Blas 5. "ple to prevent the shrining of the right to privacy, 0hich the

revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as 7the most comprehensive of rights and the r ight most valued by civili:ed men.71 Petitioner

"ple prays that 0e invalidate dministrative "rder >o. (*' entitled 7doption of a >ational Computeri:ed

2dentification Reference ystem7 on t0o important constitutional grounds, $iz ) one, it is a usurpation of the

po0er of Congress to legislate, and t0o, it impermissibly intrudes on our citi:enryAs protected :one of

privacy. 4e grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers

against further erosion.

.". >o. (*' 0as issued by President 5idel G. Ramos "n 1ecember %#, %&&$ and reads as follo0s)

1"PT2"> "5 >T2">L C"MP-T/R2K/1

21/>T252CT2"> R/5/R/>C/ T/M

4@/R/, there is a need to provide 5ilipino citi:ens and foreign residents 0ith the

facility to conveniently transact business 0ith basic service and social security providers

and other government instrumentalities

4@/R/, this 0ill re9uire a computeri:ed system to properly and efficiently identify

persons seeing basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate

fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations

4@/R/, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and

social security providing agencies and other government intrumentalities is re9uired to

achieve such a system

>"4, T@/R/5"R/, 2, 521/L G. RM", President of the Republic of the Philippines, by

virtue of the po0ers vested in me by la0, do hereby direct the follo0ing)

ec. %. 7sta2lish!ent of a /ational #o!poterized 'dentification *eference Syste!.

decentrali:ed 2dentification Reference ystem among the ey basic services and social

security providers is hereby established.


15/34

ec. #. 'nter6&ency #oordinatin& #o!!ittee. n 2nter!gency Coordinating Committee

E2CCF to dra0!up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the

ystem is hereby created, chaired by the /6ecutive ecretary, 0ith the follo0ing as

members)

@ead, Presidential Management taff

ecretary, >ational /conomic 1evelopment uthority

ecretary, 1epartment of the 2nterior and Local 3overnment

ecretary, 1epartment of @ealth

dministrator, 3overnment ervice 2nsurance ystem,

dministrator, ocial ecurity ystem,

dministrator, >ational tatistics "ffice

Managing 1irector, >ational Computer Center.

ec. (. Secretariat . The >ational Computer Center E>CCF is hereby designated as

secretariat to the 2CC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to

the 2CC.

ec. . Linka&e !on& &encies. The Population Reference >umber EPR>F generated

by the >" shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linage among

concerned agencies. The 2CC ecretariat shall coordinate 0ith the different ocial

ecurity and ervices gencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics

Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems.

ec. +. #ond"ct of 'nfor!ation Disse!ination #a!pai&n. The "ffice of the Press

ecretary, in coordination 0ith the >ational tatistics "ffice, the 32 and as lead

agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertae a massive tri!media information

dissemination campaign to educate and raise public a0areness on the importance and

use of the PR> and the ocial ecurity 2dentification Reference.

ec. $. -"ndin& . The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be

sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

ec. ?. S"2!ission of *e&"lar *eports. The >", 32 and shall submit regular

reports to the "ffice of the President through the 2CC, on the status of implementation of this undertaing.

ec. '. 7ffecti$ity . This dministrative "rder shall tae effect immediately.

1">/ in the City of Manila, this %#th day of 1ecember in the year of "ur Lord, >ineteen

@undred and >inety!i6.

E31.F 521/L G. RM"


16/34

.". >o. (*' 0as published in four ne0spapers of general circulation on January ##, %&&? and January

#(, %&&?. "n January #, %&&?, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then /6ecutive

ecretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, 0ho as members of the 2nter!gency

Coordinating Committee, are charged 0ith the implementation of .". >o. (*'. "n pril ', %&&?, 0e

issued a temporary restraining order en8oining its implementation.

Petitioner contends)

. T@/ /TBL2>M/>T "5 >T2">L C"MP-T/R2K/1 21/>T252CT2">

R/5/R/>C/ T/M R/D-2R/ L/32LT2G/ CT. T@/ 2->C/ "5 .". >".

(*' B T@/ PR/21/>T "5 T@/ R/P-BL2C "5 T@/ P@2L2PP2>/ 2, T@/R/5"R/,

> ->C">T2T-T2">L --RPT2"> "5 T@/ L/32LT2G/ P"4/R "5 T@/

C">3R/ "5 T@/ R/P-BL2C "5 T@/ P@2L2PP2>/.

B. T@/ PPR"PR2T2"> "5 P-BL2C 5->1 B T@/ PR/21/>T 5"R T@/

2MPL/M/>TT2"> "5 .". >". (*' 2 > ->C">T2T-T2">L --RPT2"> "5

T@/ /CL-2G/ R23@T "5 C">3R/ T" PPR"PR2T/ P-BL2C 5->1 5"R

/P/>12T-R/.

C. T@/ 2MPL/M/>TT2"> "5 .". >". (*' 2>212"-L L T@/ 3R"->14"RI

5"R T/M 4@2C@ 42LL G2"LT/ T@/ B2LL "5 R23@T />@R2>/1 2> T@/

C">T2T-T2">.

Respondents counter!argue)

. T@/ 2>T>T P/T2T2"> 2 >"T J-T2C2BL/ C/ 4"-L1 4RR>T

J-12C2L R/G2/4

B. .". >". (*' ;%&&$< 4 2-/1 42T@2> T@/ //C-T2G/ >1

1M2>2TRT2G/ P"4/R "5 T@/ PR/21/>T 42T@"-T />CR"C@2>3 ">

T@/ L/32LT2G/ P"4/R "5 C">3R/

C. T@/ 5->1 >/C/R 5"R T@/ 2MPL/M/>TT2"> "5 T@/ 21/>T252CT2">

R/5/R/>C/ T/M M B/ "-RC/1 5R"M T@/ B-13/T "5 T@/

C">C/R>/1 3/>C2/

1. .". >". (*' ;%&&$< PR"T/CT > 2>12G21-LA 2>T/R/T 2> PR2GC. 3

4e no0 resolve.

2

s is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to

sue of the petitioner and the 8usticiability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that

petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of .". >o. (*' have yet to be

promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner "ple is a distinguished member of our

enate. s a enator, petitioner is possessed of the re9uisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that

the issuance of .". >o. (*' is a usurpation of legislative po0er. s ta6payer and member of the


17/34

3overnment ervice 2nsurance ystem E32F, petitioner can also impugn the legality of the

misalignment of public funds and the misuse of 32 funds to implement .". >o. (*'. 5

The ripeness for ad8udication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules

of .". >o. (*' have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner "ple assails .". >o. (*' as invalid per se and as

infirmed on its face. @is action is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal

defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the implementation of .". >o. (*' 0ithout0aiting for the rules. s early as January %&, %&&?, respondent ocial ecurity ystem EF caused the

publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the >ational 2dentification E21F card. 6 Respondent

/6ecutive ecretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the 32 and the have

completed the guidelines for the national identification system. / ll signals from the respondents sho0

their uns0erving 0ill to implement .". >o. (*' and 0e need not 0ait for the formality of the rules to pass

8udgment on its constitutionality. 2n this light, the dissenters insistence that 0e tighten the rule on standing

is not a commendable stance as its result 0ould be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a

fundamental right.

22

4e no0 come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that .". >o. (*' is not a mere administrative orderbut a la0 and hence, beyond the po0er of the President to issue. @e alleges that .". >o. (*'

establishes a system of identification that is all!encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every

5ilipino citi:en and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

PetitionerAs sedulous concern for the /6ecutive not to trespass on the la0maing domain of Congress is

understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line bet0een the po0er of the Legislature to mae la0s

and the po0er of the /6ecutive to e6ecute la0s 0ill disturb their delicate balance of po0er and cannot be

allo0ed. @ence, the e6ercise by one branch of government of po0er belonging to another 0ill be given a

stricter scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and /6ecutive po0er is not indistinct. Legislative po0er is 7the

authority, under the Constitution, to mae la0s, and to alter and repeal them.7 8 The Constitution, as the0ill of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this po0er in the Congress

of the Philippines. 9 The grant of legislative po0er to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive. 10

The legislative body possesses plenary po0er for all purposes of civil government. 11 ny po0er, deemed

to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution

has lodged it else0here. 1 2n fine, e6cept as limited by the Constitution, either e6pressly or impliedly,

legislative po0er embraces all sub8ects and e6tends to matters of general concern or common interest. 13

4hile Congress is vested 0ith the po0er to enact la0s, the President e6ecutes the la0s. 1 The e6ecutive

po0er is vested in the Presidents. 15 2t is generally defined as the po0er to enforce and administer the

la0s. 16 2t is the po0er of carrying the la0s into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. 1/

s head of the /6ecutive 1epartment, the President is the Chief /6ecutive. @e represents thegovernment as a 0hole and sees to it that all la0s are enforced by the officials and employees of his

department. 18 @e has control over the e6ecutive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he

has the authority to assume directly the functions of the e6ecutive department, bureau and office or

interfere 0ith the discretion of its officials. 19 Corollary to the po0er of control, the President also has the

duty of supervising the enforcement of la0s for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus,

he is granted administrative po0er over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge

his duties effectively. 0


18/34

dministrative po0er is concerned 0ith the 0or of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined

by proper governmental organs. 1 2t enables the President to fi6 a uniform standard of administrative

efficiency and chec the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,

rules and regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, 0e hold that .". >o. (*' involves a sub8ect that is not appropriate to

be covered by an administrative order. n administrative order is)

ec. (. d!inistrati$e (rders. H cts of the President 0hich relate to particular aspects

of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be

promulgated in administrative orders. 3

n administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President 0hich relates to specific aspects

in the administrative operation of government. 2t must be in harmony 0ith the la0 and should be

for the sole purpose of implementing the la0 and carrying out the legislative policy. 4e re8ect

the argument that .". >o. (*' implements the legislative policy of the dministrative Code of

%&'?. The Code is a general la0 and 7incorporates in a unified document the ma8or structural,

functional and procedural principles of governance.7 5 and 7embodies changes in administrative

structure and procedures designed to serve thepeople.7 6 The Code is divided into seven E?F Boos) Boo 2 deals 0ith overeignty and 3eneral

dministration, Boo 22 0ith the 1istribution of Po0ers of the three branches of 3overnment, Boo

222 on the "ffice of the President, Boo 2G on the /6ecutive Branch, Boo G on Constitutional

Commissions, Boo G2 on >ational 3overnment Budgeting, and Boo G22 on dministrative

Procedure. These Boos contain provisions on the organi:ation, po0ers and general

administration of the e6ecutive, legislative and 8udicial branches of government, the organi:ation

and administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the e6ecutive branch, the

organi:ation and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the

rules on the national government budget, as 0ell as guideline for the e6ercise by administrative

agencies of 9uasi!legislative and 9uasi!8udicial po0ers. The Code covers both the internal

administration of government, i .e1 internal organi:ation, personnel and recruitment, supervision

and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on privateindividuals or parties outside government. /

2t cannot be simplistically argued that .". >o. (*' merely implements the dministrative Code of %&'?. 2t

establishes for the first time a >ational Computeri:ed 2dentification Reference ystem. uch a ystem

re9uires a delicate ad8ustment of various contending state policies H the primacy of national security, the

e6tent of privacy interest against dossier!gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. 2ndeed, the

dissent of Mr. Justice Mendo:a states that the .". >o. (*' involves the all!important freedom of thought.

s said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citi:enry $is6a6$is the

tate as 0ell as the line that separates the administrative po0er of the President to mae rules and the

legislative po0er of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals 0ith a sub8ect that should be covered by

la0.

>or is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that .1. >o. (*' is not a la0 because it confers no right,

imposes no duty, affords no proctection, and creates no office. -nder .". >o. (*', a citi:en cannot

transact business 0ith government agencies delivering basic services to the people 0ithout the

contemplated identification card. >o citi:en 0ill refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid

dealing 0ith government. 2t is thus clear as daylight that 0ithout the 21, a citi:en 0ill have difficulty

e6ercising his rights and en8oying his privileges. 3iven this reality, the contention that .". >o. (*' gives

no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.


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gain, 0ith due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly e6pand the limits of administrative legislation and

conse9uently erodes the plenary po0er of Congress to mae la0s. This is contrary to the established

approach defining the traditional limits of administrative legislation. s 0ell stated by 5isher) 7. . . Many

regulations ho0ever, bear directly on the public. 2t is here that administrative legislation must he restricted

in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy!

maing that Congress enacts in the form of a public la0. lthough administrative regulations are entitled

to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of po0er to maela0s.7 8

222

ssuming, arguendo, that .". >o. (*' need not be the sub8ect of a la0, still it cannot pass constitutional

muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of

privacy is the 7right to be let alone.7 9 2n the %&$+ case of 3ris0old v. Connecticut, 30 the -nited tates

upreme Court gave more substance to the right of privacy 0hen it ruled that the right has a constitutional

foundation. 2t held that there is a right of privacy 0hich can be found 0ithin the penumbras of the 5irst,

Third, 5ourth, 5ifth and >inth mendments, 31 $iz )

pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations fromthese guarantees that help give them life and substance . . . various guarantees create

:ones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the 5irst

mendment is one, as 0e have seen. The Third mendment in its prohibition against the

9uartering of soldiers 7in any house7 in time of peace 0ithout the consent of the o0ner is

another facet of that privacy. The 5ourth mendment e6plicitly affirms the AAright of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses and effects, against unreasonable searches

and sei:ures.7 The 5ifth mendment in its elf!2ncrimination Clause enables the citi:en to

create a :one of privacy 0hich government may not force him to surrender to his

detriment. The >inth mendment provides) 7The enumeration in the Constitution, of

certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.7

2n the %&$' case of Morfe $. M"t"c ,3

0e adopted the 3ris0old ruling that there is a constitutionalright to privacy. peaing thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, /nri9ue 5ernando, 0e held)

666 666 666

The 3ris0old case invalidated a Connecticut statute 0hich made the use of

contraceptives a criminal offence on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional

invasion of the right of privacy of married persons rightfully it stressed 7a relationship

lying 0ithin the :one of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional

guarantees.7 2t has 0ider implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has

come into its o0n.

o it is lie0ise in our 8urisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognitionindependently of its identification 0ith liberty in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional

protection. The language of Prof. /merson is particularly apt) 7The concept of limited

government has al0ays included the idea that governmental po0ers stop short of certain

intrusions into the personal life of the citi:en. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions

bet0een absolute and limited government. -ltimate and pervasive control of the

individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmar of the absolute state. 2n contrast, a

system of limited government safeguards a private sector, 0hich belongs to the

individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, 0hich the state can control.


20/34

Protection of this private sector H protection, in other 0ords, of the dignity and integrity of

the individual H has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.

ll the forces of a technological age H industriali:ation, urbani:ation, and organi:ation H

operate to narro0 the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. 2n modern terms, the

capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life mars the difference bet0een

a democratic and a totalitarian society.7

2ndeed, if 0e e6tend our 8udicial ga:e 0e 0ill find that the right of privacy is recogni:ed and enshrined in

several provisions of our Constitution. 33 2t is e6pressly recogni:ed in section ( E%F of the Bill of Rights)

ec. (. E%F The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable e6cept

upon la0ful order of the court, or 0hen public safety or order re9uires other0ise as

prescribed by la0.

"ther facets of the right to privacy are protectad in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, $iz ) 3

ec. %. >o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 0ithout due process of la0,

nor shall any person be denied the e9ual protection of the la0s.

ec. #. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and effects

against unreasonable searches and sei:ures of 0hatever nature and for any purpose

shall be inviolable, and no search 0arrant or 0arrant of arrest shall issue e6cept upon

probable cause to be determined personally by the 8udge after e6amination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the 0itnesses he may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be sei:ed.

666 666 666

ec. $. The liberty of abode and of changing the same 0ithin the limits prescribed by la0

shall not be impaired e6cept upon la0ful order of the court. >either shall the right to travel

be impaired e6cept in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health asmay be provided by la0.

666 666 666

ec. '. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private

sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to la0 shall

not be abridged.

ec. %?. >o person shall be compelled to be a 0itness against himself.

Kones of privacy are lie0ise recogni:ed and protected in our la0s. The Civil Code provides that 7;e


21/34

2ntellectual Property Code. 3 The Rules of Court on privileged communication lie0ise recogni:e the

privacy of certain information.

-nlie the dissenters, 0e prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right

guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to sho0 that .". >o. (*' is

8ustified by some compelling state interest and that it is narro0ly dra0n. .". >o. (*' is predicated on t0o

considerations) E%F the need to provides our citi:ens and foreigners 0ith the facility to convenientlytransact business 0ith basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities

and E#F the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by

persons seeing basic services. 2t is debatable 0hether these interests are compelling enough to 0arrant

the issuance of .". >o. (*'. But 0hat is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth

of .". >o. (*' 0hich if implemented 0ill put our peopleAs right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of .". >o. (*' lies in its ection 0hich provides for a Population Reference >umber EPR>F

as a 7common reference number to establish a linage among concerned agencies7 through the use of

7Biometrics Technology7 and 7computer application designs.7

Biometry or biometrics is 7the science of the applicatin of statistical methods to biological facts a

mathematical analysis of biological data.7 5 The term 7biometrics7 has evolved into a broad category oftechnologies 0hich provide precise confirmation of an individualAs identity through the use of the

individualAs o0n physiological and behavioral characteristics. 6 physiological characteristic is a relatively

stable physical characteristic such as a f ingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features.

behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individualAs personality and includes voice print, signature

and eystroe. / Most biometric idenfication systems use a card or personal identificatin number EP2>F for

initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or

entering the P2> is the legitimate o0ner of the card or P2>. 8

most common form of biological encoding is finger!scanning 0here technology scans a fingertip and

turns the uni9ue pattern therein into an individual number 0hich is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored

in computer data bans 9 and becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This

technology re9uires oneAs fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided.50

nothermethod is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary

pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a uni9ue print similar to a finger print. 51 nother

biometric method is no0n as the 7artificial nose.7 This device chemically analy:es the uni9ue

combination of substances e6creted from the sin of people. 5 The latest on the list of biometric

achievements is the thermogram. cientists have found that by taing pictures of a face using infra!red

cameras, a uni9ue heat distribution pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, sin, fat and blood

vessels all contribute to the individualAs personal 7heat signature.7 53

2n the last fe0 decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. ome science fictions are no0

science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. 2t is a

ne0 science that uses various technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an

individual for identification. 2t is note0orthy that .". >o. (*' does not state 0hat specific biologicalcharacteristics and 0hat particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people 0ho 0ill see its

coverage. Considering the ban9uest of options available to the implementors of .". >o. (*', the fear

that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.

.". >o. (*' should also raise our antennas for a further loo 0ill sho0 that it does not state 0hether

encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. 2n fact, the olicitor

3eneral claims that the adoption of the 2dentification Reference ystem 0ill contribute to the 7generation

of population data for development planning.7 5 This is an admission that the PR> 0ill not be used solely


22/34

for identification but the generation of other data 0ith remote relation to the avo0ed purposes of .". >o.

(*'. Clearly, the indefiniteness of .". >o. (*' can give the government the roving authority to store and

retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PR>.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under .". >o. (*' cannot be undarplayed as the

dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PR> everytime he

deals 0ith a government agency to avail of basic services and security. @is transactions 0ith thegovernment agency 0ill necessarily be recorded H 0hether it be in the computer or in the documentary

file of the agency. The individualAs file may include his transactions for loan availments, income ta6

returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitali:ation, etc. The more

fre9uent the use of the PR>, the better the chance of building a huge formidable informatin base through

the electronic linage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government

purposes but the e6istence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to

misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. 56

4e can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file 0ill be limited to the name, address and other

basic personal infomation about the individual. 5/ /ven that hospitable assumption 0ill not save .". >o.

(*' from constitutional infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms ho0

these information gathered shall he handled. 2t does not provide 0ho shall control and access the data,under 0hat circumstances and for 0hat purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and

guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 4ell to note, the computer linage gives other government

agencies access to the information. et, there are no controls to guard against leaage of information.

4hen the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broen, an intruder,

0ithout fear of sanction or penalty, can mae use of the data for 0hatever purpose, or 0orse, manipulate

the data stored 0ithin the system. 59

2t is plain and 0e hold that .". >o. (*' falls short of assuring that personal information 0hich 0ill be

gathered about our people 0ill only be processed for une9uivocally specified purposes. 60 The lac of

proper safeguards in this regard of .". >o. (*' may interfere 0ith the individualAs liberty of abode and

travel by enabling authorities to trac do0n his movement it may also enable unscrupulous persons to

access confidential information and circumvent the right against self!incrimination it may pave the 0ay for 7fishing e6peditions7 by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and

sei:ures. 61 The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PR>, biometrics and computer technology are

accentuated 0hen 0e consider that the individual lacs control over 0hat can be read or placed on his 21,

much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 6 They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of

Rights sees to prevent. 63

The ability of sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle!to!grave dossier on an

individual and transmit it over a national net0or is one of the most graphic threats of the computer

revolution. 6 The computer is capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of

information given at different times and for varied purposes. 65 2t can continue adding to the stored data

and eeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored date is simple. 4hen information of a

privileged character finds its 0ay into the computer, it can be e6tracted together 0ith other data on the

sub8ect. 66 "nce e6tracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.

Though .". >o. (*' is undoubtedly not narro0ly dra0n, the dissenting opinions 0ould dismiss its danger

to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. gain, 0e cannot countenance such a laidbac

posture. The Court 0ill not be true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the peopleAs liberty if it 0ould not

immediately smother the spars that endanger their rights but 0ould rather 0ait for the fire that could

consume them.


23/34

4e re8ect the argument of the olicitor 3eneral that an individual has a reasonable e6pectation of privacy

0ith regard to the >atioal 21 and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on 9uicsand. The

reasonableness of a personAs e6pectation of privacy depends on a t0o!part test) E%F 0hether by his

conduct, the individual has e6hibited an e6pectation of privacy and E#F 0hether this e6pectation is one

that society recogni:es as reasonable. 6/ The factual circumstances of the case determines the

reasonableness of the e6pectation. 68 @o0ever, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings

and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this e6pectation. 69 The use ofbiometrics and computer technology in .". >o. (*' does not assure the individual of a reasonable

e6pectation of privacy. /0 s technology advances, the level of reasonably e6pected privacy decreases. /1

The measure of protection granted by the reasonable e6pectation diminishes as relevant technology

becomes more 0idely accepted. / The security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical

inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hard0are and soft0are computer technology. .".

>o. (*' is so 0idely dra0n that a minimum standard for a reasonable e6pectation of privacy, regardless

of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.

The rules and regulations to be by the 2CC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations

merely implement the policy of the la0 or order. "n its face, .". >o. gives the 2CC virtually infettered

discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the 21 ystem.

>or do your present la0s prvide ade9uate safeguards for a reasonable e6pectation of privacy.

Common0ealth ct. >o. +&% penali:es the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to

the >" 0ith imprisonment and fine. /3 Republic ct. >o. %%$% prohibits public disclosure of

employment records and reports. / These la0s, ho0ever, apply to records and data 0ith the >" and the

. 2t is not clear 0hether they may be applied to data 0ith the other government agencies forming part

of the >ational 21 ystem. The need to clarify the penal aspect of .". >o. (*' is another reason 0hy its

enactment should be given to Congress.

>e6t, the olicitor 3eneral urges us to validate .". >o. (*'As abridgment of the right of privacy by using

the rational relationship test. /5 @e stressed that the purposes of .". >o. (*' are) E%F to streamline and

speed up the implementation of basic government services, E#F eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of

services, and E(F generate population data for development planning. @e cocludes that these purposes 8ustify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means are rationally related to the end. /6

4e are not impressed by the argument. 2n Morfe $. M"t"c , // 0e upheld the constitutionality of R.. (*%&,

the nti!3raft and Corrupt Practices ct, as a valid police po0er measure. 4e declared that the la0, in

compelling a public officer to mae an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of

income and e6penses, did not infringe on the individualAs right to privacy. The la0 0as enacted to promote

morality in public administration by curtailing and minimi:ing the opportunities for official corruption and

maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. /8

The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. 5or one, R.. (*%& is a statute, not an

administrative order. econdly, R.. (*%& itself is sufficiently detailed. The la0 is clear on 0hat practices

0ere prohibited and penali:ed, and it 0as narro0ly dra0n to avoid abuses. 2> the case at bar, .". >o.(*' may have been impelled by a 0orthy purpose, but, it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not

narro0ly dra0n. nd 0e no0 hod that 0hen the integrity of a fundamental right is at stae, this court 0ill

give the challenged la0, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. 2t 0ill not do for the

authorities to invoe the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. >or is it enough for

the authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated,

even 0hen the government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily sho0 the presence of

compelling state interests and that the la0, rule or regulation is narro0ly dra0n to preclude abuses. This

approach is demanded by the %&'? Constitution 0hose entire matri6 is designed to protect human rights


24/34

and to prevent authoritarianism. 2n case of doubt, the least 0e can do is to lean to0ards the stance that

0ill not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitutions.

The case of Whalen $. *oe /9 cited by the olicitor 3eneral is also off!line. 2n 4halen, the -nited tates

upreme Court 0as presented 0ith the 9uestion of 0hether the tate of >e0 or could eep a

centrali:ed computer record of the names and addresses of all persons 0ho obtained certain drugs

pursuant to a doctorAs prescription. The >e0 or tate Controlled ubstance ct of %&?# re9uiredphysicians to identify parties obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i .e., drugs 0ith a

recogni:ed medical use but 0ith a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients

can be recorded in a centrali:ed computer file of the tate 1epartment of @ealth. The plaintiffs, 0ho 0ere

patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear

that the computeri:ed data may be readily available and open to public disclosure and that once

disclosed, it may stigmati:e them as drug addicts. 80 The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a

constitutionally protected :one of privacy, i .e., the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal

matters, and the interest in independence in maing certain inds of important decisions. The -..

upreme Court held that 0hile an individualAs interest in avoiding disclosuer of personal matter is an

aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional

violation. The Court found that the statute 0as necessary to aid in the enforcement of la0s designed to

minimi:e the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient!identification re9uirement 0as a product of anorderly and rational legislative decision made upon recommmendation by a specially appointed

commission 0hich held e6tensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute 0as narro0ly dra0n and

contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid do0n the procedure

and re9uirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the informatin. 2t ebumerated 0ho 0ere

authori:ed to access the data. 2t also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its

violation. 2n vie0 of these safeguards, the infringement of the patientsA right to privacy 0as 8ustified by a

valid e6ercise of police po0er. s 0e discussed above, .". >o. (*' lacs these vital safeguards.

/ven 0hile 0e strie do0n .". >o. (*', 0e spell out in neon that the Court is not per se agains the use

of computers to accumulate, store, process, retvieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy.

Computers 0or 0onders to achieve the efficiency 0hich both government and private industry see.

Many information system in different countries mae use of the computer to facilitate important socialob8ective, such as better la0 enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management

of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial

activities. 81 -sed 0isely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by maing accurate

and comprehensive information for those 0ho have to frame policy and mae ey decisions. 8 The

benefits of the computer has revolutioni:ed information technology. 2t developed the internet, 83 introduced

the concept of cyberspace 8 and the information superhigh0ay 0here th

Documents

Poli Rev Cases Finals (4.23.2016)