5

Click here to load reader

Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn

  • Upload
    david

  • View
    216

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn

This article was downloaded by: [University of Connecticut]On: 06 October 2014, At: 06:45Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Social Epistemology: A Journal ofKnowledge, Culture and PolicyPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tsep20

Steve Fuller's Thomas KuhnDavid Martens aa Auburn University, USAPublished online: 24 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: David Martens (2003) Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn, Social Epistemology: A Journalof Knowledge, Culture and Policy, 17:2-3, 225-228, DOI: 10.1080/0269172032000144216

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0269172032000144216

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn

Social Epistemology ISSN 0269-1728 print/ISSN 1464-5297 online © 2003 Taylor & Francis Ltdhttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/0269172032000144216

SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, 2003, VOL. 17, NOS. 2 & 3, 225–228

*This review was originally published in Philosophy in Review 21, 2001, pp. 43–46. It is reprinted here withminor revisions. I thank Francis Remedios for helpful discussions.

Author: David B. Martens, Auburn University, USA

Steve Fuller’s Thomas Kuhn*

DAVID B. MARTENS

In earlier books, Steve Fuller made bold recommendations for the study of science,including the history, sociology, and philosophy of science. In Thomas Kuhn: APhilosophical History for Our Times (Fuller 2000), he presents at length a concrete andworked out example of how things are to be done on his approach. His boldnessis undiminished, but the results are mixed. Thomas Kuhn’s more socio-historicalcontent, which predominates, is a substantial expansion of an earlier article (Fuller1992). On the other hand, there seems to be little in the book’s more theoreticalphilosophical content that is not presented more fully in Fuller’s earlier books(Fuller 1988, 1989, 1993, 1997). Indeed, there are only a few overt references inThomas Kuhn to Fuller’s own position, ‘social epistemology’, and most of those arein footnotes. Thus, notwithstanding the book’s subtitle, philosophers interested inthe theoretical aspects of Fuller’s social epistemology and its argumentativeunderpinnings should look to his earlier books and to the critical discussion ofthose books in the literature.

I don’t think the socio-historical plot of Thomas Kuhn is either misrepresented orgiven away too much by the following summary. One fact to be explained is thatThomas Kuhn and his book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Kuhn 1962), havebeen canonised by the academy (Fuller 2000, p. 379). A second fact to be explainedis that ‘the impact of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been largely, thoughnot entirely, for the worse’ (p. xvi). Specifically, the consequences of the‘Kuhnification’ of the academy have been overwhelmingly anti-critical and anti-democratic (pp. 7–8). (If it seems to strain credulity to hold Kuhn personallyresponsible for all the evils Fuller sees, readers should note well Fuller’s cautionthat his ‘main interest is in evaluating “Kuhn” as an ideal type of how academicsrespond to their social environment’ [p. 381].) A naive explanation for the first factis to suppose that Kuhn was an extraordinary person with superior intellectualabilities and that Structure is a profound and original book. But this explanationcannot be correct. For one thing, Kuhn was not particularly gifted intellectually oreven particularly admirable or competent as a person. (Connoisseurs of schaden-freude will appreciate Fuller’s diligent and acute rhetorical exploitation of hisobligation to defend this premise, even as they wonder about the accuracy andfairness of his claims and insinuations. But they should beware the possibility that

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

6:45

06

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 3: Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn

226 DAVID B. MARTENS

they themselves are instances of Fuller’s ideal type ‘Kuhn’.) For another, ‘manyKuhn-like ideas were “in the air” both before and during the time Structure waswritten’ (p. 5) and, ‘Certainly, [Structure] does not encourage a deep reading’ (p.31). Further, the naive explanation does not account for the fact that the impact ofStructure has been largely for the worse. Fuller defends a different explanation, onthe grounds that it best accounts for all the facts at issue. That explanation is muchmore complex than its naive competitor, and appeals to personal and situationalfactors in the particular socio-historical context of which Structure was the product.The general drift of Fuller’s explanation is suggested already in his initial urging‘that Structure be read as an exemplary document of the Cold War era’ (p. 5). Todescribe the socio-historical plot further here would be to risk spoiling the story forreaders of the book.

The theoretical and applied philosophical content of Thomas Kuhn is motivatedby Fuller’s desire ‘to overcome Structure’s effects on its readers’ (p. 37) and thus torecover ‘that lost [critical] space in the academic sphere’ and to contribute ‘to ademocratisation of science in the public sphere’ (pp. 7–8). Fuller uses his owndisappointment at how things have gone ‘to point out better paths that wereoriginally not taken, but that (with some adjustment) may be taken up in thefuture’ (p. xvi). Here it seems clear that Fuller is consciously taking up thechallenge issued by Kuhn when he said that ‘The search for the integrity of adiscarded mode of thought is not what philosophers generally do; many of them,in fact reject it as the glorification of past error. But the job can be done. . . .’ (Kuhn1977, p. 11) The ‘paths not taken’ identified by Fuller include ‘social science ascritique of natural science’ (Fuller 2000, p. 229), C.I. Lewis’s view ‘that philosophyis primarily a normative discipline, with logic and epistemology ultimatelygrounded in ethics’ (p. 267), ‘Toulmin’s route from philosophy to rhetoric’ (p.309) and, most importantly for Fuller, an approach to knowledge production thatinvolves ‘movement-driven “citizen-science” ’ rather than ‘paradigm-driven “pro-fessional science” ’ (p. 418).

Fuller tries to distance himself historiographically from Kuhn by claiming that,‘according to Kuhn, a history of the contemporary world—such as the one you arenow reading—is impossible’ (p. 3). Fuller exaggerates the distance, I think. Tosupport his claim, Fuller offers a footnote reference to a paper by Kuhn. (Thereference offered is to a paper of Kuhn’s in Suppe, 1974; but context and thepagination in Fuller’s footnote suggest that the intended reference is actually to thefirst paper in Kuhn, 1977.) However, what Kuhn says in the paper referred to doesnot support Fuller’s claim. What Kuhn says is that ‘an ability to predict the futureis no part of the historian’s arsenal. He is neither a social scientist nor a seer. It isno mere accident that he knows the end of his narrative as well as the start beforehe begins to write. History cannot be written without that information’ (Kuhn1977, p. 16). All this is fully compatible with the historian’s being able to write ahistory of the contemporary world with a narrative that ends roughly now. There isa stronger appearance of incompatibility between Fuller’s ‘philosophical history’project and Kuhn’s statement that ‘To say that history of science and philosophy ofscience have different goals is to suggest that no one can practice them both at thesame time’ (Kuhn 1977, p. 5). But even this appearance of incompatibilityevaporates when one realises that Kuhn and Fuller use the word ‘philosophy’differently. For Kuhn, philosophy is essentially a cognitive activity. ‘The philosopher. . . aims principally at explicit generalisations and at those with universal scope. He

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

6:45

06

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 4: Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn

STEVE FULLER’S THOMAS KUHN 227

is no teller of stories, true or false. His goal is to discover and state what is true atall times and places rather than to impart understanding of what occurred at aparticular time and place’ (Kuhn 1977, p. 5). For Fuller, on the other hand,philosophy (in the primary sense in which his conceives of his own project asphilosophical) is essentially a practical activity, not a cognitive one. For Fuller,philosophy essentially uses ‘community-building, action-getting’ rhetoric to furtherthe present and future common good (Fuller 2000, p. 313). And telling someonea historically based parable might well be a good way to inspire her to change herbehaviour for the better. I don’t see Kuhn disagreeing with that.

The fact that Fuller conceives of philosophy as rhetoric goes a long way toexplaining his manner of presenting the more theoretical philosophical contentof Thomas Kuhn. (Another explanation lies in Kuhn’s observation that ‘there aregreat difficulties about practicing [history and philosophy] alternately’ [Kuhn,1977, p. 5].) Fuller’s discussion of C.I. Lewis is a good example. Fuller is perhapsright that Lewis deserves more attention than he gets nowadays from philoso-phers. However, it misleadingly understates Lewis’s impact on contemporaryphilosophy to say that ‘He is forgotten . . . for his rather bold claim thatphilosophy is primarily a normative discipline, with logic and epistemologyultimately grounded in ethics’ (Fuller 2000, p. 267). In fact, the idea thatepistemology is founded on ethics does have a respectable place in contemporaryepistemology. (For a well-received recent defence, see Zagzebski, 1996.) The ideamight have been more widely accepted, had it not been undermined indirectly byLewis himself, via influential critiques published by two highly regarded studentsof his. (See Chisholm, 1966, pp. 11–14; Chisholm, 1968; and Firth, 1978.) Fullergoes on to offer a long discussion of Lewis’s views on the place of logic inphilosophy (Fuller 2000, pp. 268–280). I regret to say that, so far as I can see, thisdiscussion is largely incoherent, in part because Fuller runs roughshod overstandard conceptual distinctions between analyticity, a prioricity, and necessity. Inthe context of Fuller’s rhetorical project, my complaints may seem only to besymptoms of ‘culturopathy’, a disorder characterised by a ‘state of diminishedcultural responsibility’ and one to which academics are susceptible (Fuller 2000,pp. 397–98). After all, in discussing Lewis’s theoretical doctrines, Fuller doessucceed in emphasising the undeniably important truth that how one lives isfundamentally more important than how one reasons or what one knows.Nevertheless, a too blatantly ironical handling of facts and arguments seemsrhetorically counterproductive, if one’s aim is to build ethos with potentialaudience members who are earnest, not only about the common good, but alsoabout the public trust they hold to handle facts and arguments conscientiously intheir respective areas of expertise.

References

CHISHOLM, R. M., 1966, Theory of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall).CHISHOLM, R. M., 1968, Lewis’s ethics of belief. In P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of C.I. Lewis (La

Salle: Open Court), pp. 223–242.FIRTH, R., 1978, Are epistemic concepts reducible to ethical concepts? In A.I. Goldman and J. Kim

(eds), Values and Morals: Essays in Honor of William Frankena, Charles Stevenson, and Richard Brandt(Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel), pp. 215–229.

FULLER, S., 1988, Social Epistemology (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press).FULLER, S., 1989, Philosophy of Science and Its Discontents (New York: Guilford Press).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

6:45

06

Oct

ober

201

4

Page 5: Steve Fuller's Thomas Kuhn

228 DAVID B. MARTENS

FULLER, S., 1993, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge: The Coming of Science and TechnologyStudies (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press).

FULLER, S., 1992, Being there with Thomas Kuhn: a parable for postmodern times. History and Theory,31, 241–275.

FULLER, S., 1997, Science (Buckingham: Open University Press).FULLER, S., 2000, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago

Press).KUHN, T. S., 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press).KUHN, T. S., 1977, The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change (Chicago, IL:

University of Chicago Press).SUPPE, F. (ed.), 1974, The Structure of Scientific Theories (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press).ZAGZEBSKI, L. T., 1996, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations

of Knowledge (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f C

onne

ctic

ut]

at 0

6:45

06

Oct

ober

201

4